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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Kathryn Mary Iurino
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Psychology
March 2018
Title: Comparative and Cross-Cultural Validity of the Moral Actions
Questionnaire, A Measure for Ethical Virtue
Though current personality models provide a starting point for measuring
ethical virtues, ethical content may not be fully captured in existing personality
inventories due in part to the systematic elimination of morally-relevant trait-
adjectives in early lexical studies. Further, personality dimensions relevant to
measuring the ethical domain include both ethical and non-ethical content.
The Moral Actions Questionnaire was designed to assess seven conceptually-
distinct ethical virtues that are emphasized across cultures and philosophies. This
dissertation investigates the performance of the Moral Actions Questionnaire,
relative to other candidate models of ethical virtue from personality inventories.
Psychometric quality, structural validity, and predictive validity for these models
are evaluated in samples from five countries: Kenya, India, Hong Kong, Singapore,
and the United States. Findings suggest that the Moral Actions Questionnaire
aids in prediction of altruistic bravery, guilt proneness, satisfaction with life, and
meaning with life across most countries. Patterns in psychometric quality and
structure across countries and methods (self- and informant-report) are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The psychological study of morality has taken many forms, ranging
from the study of people’s responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas and
moral reasoning, to people’s actual behavior in situations relevant to morality.
This dissertation takes a virtue-ethics approach to the study of morality,
conceptualizing ethical virtue1 as a tendency toward a particular type of moral
behavior across time. As has been argued elsewhere, moral psychology could
benefit from the study of moral traits as dispositions (Fleeson, Furr, Jayawickreme,
Meindl, & Helzer, 2014; Hill & Roberts, 2010), rather than from the primarily
situationist perspective that much of the field has adopted.
The psychological study of personality has also taken many forms, and
these forms have typically under-represented the domain of moral traits. That
is, in the history of personality psychology, moral content was partially excluded.
The highly influential factor analyses by Goldberg (1990) supporting a Big Five
structure were performed on a list of adjectives originating from earlier work
by Allport and Odbert (1936), who had excluded some moral content from
the variable list. Allport and Odbert (1936) had considered moral terms to be
evaluative and thus not aligned with scientific standards under which objective
descriptions are desired.
More recently, there have been a few notable integrations of moral character
into measures of personality, most notably in the Honesty/Propriety dimension
from the Big Six model of personality and the Honesty/Humility dimension in
1In this dissertation, the terms “ethical” and “moral” are treated as interchangeable, but since
the current project focuses on moral considerations that tend to be common across ethical codes,
rather than including all domains that could possibly be considered moral, the term “ethical
virtues” is generally preferred.
1
the HEXACO personality inventory. There is evidence that six-factor models
of personality are more predictive than the five-factor model (Ashton, Lee, &
De Vries, 2014).
In addition, as argued by Saucier (2017), the most central dimension of
personality is character– the tendency to regulate one’s selfish impulses with
respect to moral norms. Evidence for the centrality of moral tendencies in
personality comes from the fact that when personality is assessed using type-
nouns in American-English, by far the largest dimension that emerges is primarily
moral in content (Saucier, 2003), and similar results are obtained for type-nouns
in the Dutch language (De Raad & Hoskens, 1990). Further, moral and social
self-regulation content in personality (even if one constrains oneself to adjectives)
is more ubiquitous across diverse languages from Africa, Asia and Europe than
content of any Big Five factor (Saucier, Thalmayer, & Bel-Bahar, 2014).
The empirical reality that morality is a central component of the
personality domain, rather than something exogenous to personality, suggests
a disposition-oriented approach to understanding ethical virtues will have some
benefits. Namely, the study of the ethical domain can borrow from and be
integrated with the personality domain, thus helping to enrich our understanding
of the broader personality domain. In addition, though some have theorized that
virtuous behavior is too affected by changes in situations to be properly considered
a stable attribute of an individual (Doris, 2002), Costello, Srivastava, and Saucier
(2017) found that the Honesty/Propriety factor of the Big Six has a high degree
of test-retest stability, similar to that of other personality traits, across both
informant- and self-report methods. This suggests that measuring ethical virtues
as a stable individual-differences variable is appropriate.
2
For these reasons, the current project takes a personality-oriented
approach to assessing ethical virtues. Within personality models, there is some
representation of ethical virtues already: particularly in the Honesty/Propriety
dimension in the Big Six model (Saucier, 2009), and in the Honesty/Humility
dimension in the HEXACO model (Lee & Ashton, 2013). In the HEXACO model,
the Honesty/Humility dimension is characterized by tendencies to be manipulative
versus fair and law-abiding, and also reflects varying levels of concern for status
and possessions (Lee & Ashton, 2013). In the Big Six model, Honesty/Propriety
reflects a similar overlapping tendency, but has less emphasis on the humility
aspect, more emphasis on propriety (following social norms so as to not cause
trouble). In addition, ethical content is represented in some versions of Big Five
Agreeableness (including content related to compassion and generosity in Saucier
and Ostendorf (1999) and Big Five Conscientiousness (including content that may
be related to dependable keeping of promises, i.e., responsibility in Saucier and
Ostendorf (1999), and reliability in Roberts, Bogg, Walton, Chernyshenko, and
Stark (2004)). But ethical content is never the central component of either Big-
Five domain; it merely appears in fractionated form in several subcomponents of
these factors.
In addition, a potential limitation of these models is that the content that
was included was based on factor-analytic considerations about what makes a
good model of personality as a whole (including what kinds of content stays fairly
orthogonal to other kinds of content), rather than a rationale-based consideration
of what the basic ethical virtues are. These empirical constraints likely prevented
the ethical domain from being fully represented. For measures of the Big Five
model, the representation of ethical virtue is partial at best, as content was
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selected to the extent that it cohered with dimensions of Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness. Honesty/Humility from the HEXACO and Honesty/Propriety
from the Big Six models are more exclusively dominated by ethical content than
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness are, so could be thought to more directly
target ethical virtue than these two factors in the Big Five. However, content
related to the H domain in both these models was chosen in a way that potentially
could also have had a limiting impact on the coverage of the domain of ethical
virtues: presumably, in order to provide a reasonably well-fitting six factor model
of personality that minimizes cross-loadings, the ethical content selected would
have to be more independent from other aspects of personality. This may have
excluded certain types of ethical content that are more interstitial to H and A
(such as compassion and generosity), or H and C (such as promise-keeping).
Therefore, the study of the ethical domain would benefit from starting from
a rationale-based consideration of what the core domains of ethical virtues are, and
based on that, develop measures well-suited for measuring each domain. This is
likely to result in a more complete inventory of the ethical virtues than would be
obtainable given the constraints under which personality inventories are typically
constructed. Predictive validity and reliability of this rationally-derived model
can be assessed relative to alternative models of ethical virtues that have arisen
more incidentally, in the context of optimizing the factor structure of the entire
personality domain.
With these considerations in mind, Iurino (2012) created preliminary
measures of six domains of ethical virtue. The six domains were selected so as
to be consistent with a “minimalist” definition of morality (Bok, 1996), that is,
including “common-denominator” content that is considered relevant to morality
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across diverse philosophies and cultures. The goal was to develop measures that
will be relevant to measuring individual differences in behavior across diverse
populations, with the goal of contributing to an understanding of what is universal
about human morality rather than what is culturally-specific. The six “common-
denominator” domains originally selected were: beneficence, non-maleficence,
fairness, promise-keeping, truth-telling, and gratitude/reciprocity. These six
domains will be described next.
First, doing good for others (beneficence) and not harming others (non-
maleficence) are universal human values (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), emphasized
in moral philosophy (Bok, 1996; Nagel, 1991; Ross, 2003), in religious and non-
religious doctrines, and across many different cultures (Graham et al., 2011). More
specifically, Schwartz and Bardi (2001) found that Benevolence values– defined as
those values that have to do with contributing to the welfare of people with whom
one interacts with frequently (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyalty, responsible)–
were ranked as the most important values across a wide range of countries. Self-
Direction values (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, and choosing one’s own
goals) and Universalism values (broad-minded, wisdom, social justice, equality, a
world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment)
tied as second most important across countries.
Second, distinct from beneficence but a natural complement to it is non-
maleficence. Ross (2003) distinguishes between two morally significant classes of
duties: duties that exist because there are other beings who we can improve the
condition of (beneficence) and duties not to injure others (non-maleficence). Bok
(1996) suggests that positive duties of mutual support and reciprocity, as well as
negative duties to refrain from harm, are among the fundamental human values
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that are recognized as morally significant across diverse cultures. In addition,
Nagel (1991) describes duties of non-maleficence arising from the general rights
that all people have to be treated in certain ways- for example, to be free from
assault and coercion.
Third, a sense of fairness is likely a human universal, violations of which
are perceived even by some nonhuman primates (Brosnan & De Waal, 2003)
and emphasized by philosophers (i.e., Bok, 1996; Ross, 2003). According to Bok
(1996), all societies have some rules or procedures intended to prevent injustice in
some basic manifestations– for example, by listening to both sides in a dispute.
Ross (2003) also identifies duties of justice, defining them as ensuring that pleasure
or happiness is distributed in a way that is aligned with the merit of persons
involved.
Fourth (and fifth), promise-keeping and truth-telling behaviors are essential
to creating higher levels of trust between members of a society and groups, which
is integral to maintaining a high degree of cooperation. Promise-keeping and
honesty are emphasized by philosophers as important domains of moral behavior
(i.e., Kant, 2001; Nagel, 1991; Ross, 2003). Further, deceit is consistently rejected
in religious doctrines (e.g., Ten Commandments, Buddhist doctrine, Confucian
doctrine) and secular doctrines (Bok, 1996), and “...injunctions against violence,
deceit, and betrayal are found in most societies” (Bok, 1996, p. 15).
Sixth, behaviors relating to gratitude and reciprocity are also emphasized
across cultures (Bok, 1996). In addition, Ross (2003) suggests behaviors relating
to gratitude and reciprocity (the tendency to show thanks and return favors) are
important moral duties. Some speculate that strong reciprocity– a tendency to
cooperate with those who cooperate and punish those who fail to cooperate at
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a personal cost– may have contributed significantly to the evolution of human
altruism (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). Nagel (1991) also describes a different category
of obligations arising from the special relationships we have with others– such as
to one’s parents, the place where one works, or to one’s community. According to
Nagel, these obligations are separate from the general obligation arising from the
rights of everyone to be treated in a certain way, as they are incurred by one’s
reciprocal relation to specific others. Thus, multiple theorists converge on the
idea that a distinct category of value guiding action involves a set of moral duties
conferred by reciprocal relationships.
Later, a seventh domain– compassion– was added, inspired by interviews
done with selected members of the Eugene-Springfield Community Sample in
the summer of 20142. Though suggested from interviews with laypersons, this
domain also relates to the moral-philosophy literature. From the perspective
of moral sentimentalism (e.g., Hume), social emotions such as sympathy and
compassion are prime sources of moral knowledge and motivation. Compassion
not only informs knowledge about moral principles (Nussbaum, 1996), but is
also considered a key ethical virtue by some philosophers. Schopenhauer (2014)
considers compassion the most fundamental of the ethical virtues, arguing that it
is the sole basis for voluntary acts of justice and genuine loving-kindness. Across
disciplines, compassion is defined as having both an affective and behavioral
component– Schopenhauer (2014) defines compassion as the participation in the
sufferings of another, independent from any self-interested motives, resulting in an
effort to prevent or remove them, and in an empirical review, Goetz, Keltner, and
2An eighth domain of ethical virtue (tolerance) was also considered, also inspired by
laypersons’ conceptions of ethical virtue in the interviews conducted in the summer of 2014.
However, the initial Tolerance subscale showed too high correlations with all the other seven
domains, indicating at least the way it was measured, it was not an independent domain.
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Simon-Thomas (2010) define compassion as the feeling that arises when witnessing
another’s suffering, and the subsequent motivation to help ease that suffering.
Compassion is distinct from beneficence and non-maleficence due to the fact that
its definition contains affective and not just behavioral components.
The original item pool for each of the original six domains was created
by having four raters (the author and members of the author’s research team)
independently evaluate the extent to which each item in the International
Personality Item Pool (2458 items total) fell into the six categories of moral
considerations on a continuous rating scale. The options were -2 (indicating the
item related strongly to the negative pole of the domain), -1 (indicating the item
related moderately to the negative pole of the domain), 0 (indicating the item did
not relate the domain), 1 (indicating the item related moderately to the positive
pole of the domain), or 2 (indicating the item related strongly to the positive
pole of the domain). The International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) is a rather
comprehensive personality-item pool, developed to facilitate evaluation of the
comparative validity of a wide range of personality inventories in the interest of
developing better validated personality inventories that would be publicly available
(see ipip.ori.org).
Two of the raters evaluated all six domains, and two of the raters rated
only three of the six, thus the result was three raters for each domain. Overall
reliability for the three raters for each domain was good: Cronbach’s alpha
based on standardized items ranged from a low of .634 for Fairness to .733 for
Beneficence (see Appendix C for full list of reliabilities). Unstandardized alpha was
much lower for Promise-Keeping, Truth-Telling, and Gratitude/Reciprocity, but
this was because one of the raters had much more variance in his/her ratings of
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these domains, suggesting a more inclusive interpretation of each of these concepts.
Standardized and unstandardized alpha were very similar for the other domains.
The 127 items rated as having the very highest extent of relevance to at least one
of the six categories were considered in making one subscale of moral behavior for
each of the domains. Then, using IPIP data from multiple time points, beginning
from 1993, these scales were further refined, ending with six subscales with 5-6
items per scale. The scales were reduced to have a fairly low number of items from
an early stage given the practical expectation that data-gathering opportunities
(inclusion in large questionnaires that were measuring many other constructs each
fairly briefly) would require brief scales.
Using data from the Life and Time Study (Wave 3), Iurino (2012) found
that an abbreviated informant-version of this measure of moral behavior was
related to self-reports of elements of what could be considered a “virtue-conducive
mindset.” The informant-rated moral behavior measure was found to be positively
related to Schwartz values related to helping and being honest (Schwartz, 2009),
negatively related to unmitigated self-interest (Saucier, 2000), and to a lesser
degree, positively related to religiosity (Iurino, 2012). The informant-version was
abbreviated even more than other versions due to survey-length limitations: in this
study, informants were compensated with a drawing, and a longer survey would
have negatively impacted their motivation to participate.
In more recent work, the MAQ scales were refined using data from U.S.
samples: a 2015 administration to the Eugene-Springfield Community Sample,
(described in more detail below), Wave 1 from the Personality and Priorities
Study (the National Sample, described in more detail below), and University
of Oregon (UO) students’ ratings of someone they knew. For the UO students’
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ratings of someone they knew, items were administered in the same format as the
Student/Informant Sample, described in more detail below. For this initial scale
refinement, General Survey data from Winter and Spring 2015 was used (N=406;
Mage=19.9, SDage=3.9; 61.3% female).
The following characteristics were considered in selecting items, resulting in
a final measure with 28 items (2 forward-keyed and 2 reverse-keyed items for each
of the 7 domains):
1. Psychometric characteristics across all three samples (strength of item-
total correlations and unidimensionality as assessed both by the standard
deviation of each item’s correlations with other items, and the number of
correlations with other items that fell within .05 of the overall average inter-
item correlation).
2. Structural validity, as assessed in the Community Sample and the National
Sample: using SEM, items with high levels of cross-loadings within a seven-
factor structure were identified. According to this criterion, preference was
given to those items that did not show a strong tendency to cross-load on
multiple factors.
3. Construct validity, evaluated in the Community Sample and the National
Sample, by taking into account the correlations of items with the Guilt and
Shame Proneness Scale (GASP; all 16 items aggregated), MIDUS measure of
compassionate norms (all 10 items aggregated), Likelihood to help a cyclist
(single item), and a single MIDUS item evaluating one’s perception of one’s
overall contribution to the welfare of others. The overall strength of the
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correlation with these validity indicators was determined by adding up the
raw R2 values.3
4. As an independent indicator of validity from 3 above, the correlation of
each item with the informant-rated composite of that same domain was
evaluated.4
5. Divergent validity evaluated in the Community Sample and the National
Sample– specifically, evidence that the item was measuring ethical virtue
rather than socially desirable responding– evaluated based on how much
correlation of the item with the item “I see myself as someone who has
strong moral/ethical qualities” stayed the same when other desirable
characteristics (e.g., attractiveness, likability, intelligence) were controlled
for.
To arrive at a final set of items, each of these criteria was weighted one unit
per sample that it was evaluated in, except for the informant-report criteria (#4
above), which was double-weighted. This resulted in a final aggregate ranking for
each item reflecting its overall strength on these criteria, upon which I based the
final selection of items, under the constraint that the resulting set would contain
a balance of reverse- and forward-keyed items. Where the overall ranking was
approximately equal, items were preferred that would increase the breadth of
content representation in the scale, or the spread of item means (as a proxy for
item difficulty).
3In future scale development, it would be useful instead to use multiple regression to evaluate
the strength of the relationship between each of these items with these indicators of validity, so
that the criterion does not favor the overlap between these variables.
4Though items with the same content would be expected to have higher correlations, this
was not thought to be a problem, since preference should be given to items that are also in the
informant-report.
11
The main question that this dissertation addressed was: In what ways
is the Moral Actions Questionnaire an improvement over existing
measures of the ethical domain, and in what ways is it inferior to
existing measures? The psychometric quality and validity of the MAQ scales
were evaluated by looking at these items’ performance in comparison with other
already-established measures of the ethical domain, across two different methods
(self- and informant-report), and across samples from five different countries (U.S.,
Kenya, Hong Kong, Singapore, and India). The measures of the ethical domain
were evaluated with respect to three main categories: psychometric quality,
structure, and predictive validity. In the psychometric analyses, the measures of
the ethical domain evaluated included the MAQ, the H dimension of the HEXACO
and the H dimension of the Big Six. Big-Five models were not emphasized for
the psychometric analyses because neither Agreeableness nor Conscientiousness,
though each partly captures some content that could be considered in the domain
of ethical virtues, is centered on the ethical virtues, and many such virtues
seem to fall outside of or between them. However, Big Five Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness were included (in addition to the MAQ, H from HEXACO, and
H from the Big Six) in the predictive validity analyses, as it is useful to compare
the extent to which all these scales predict relevant outcomes.
Investigation into the structure of the MAQ was guided by a couple of
theoretical considerations. Though the MAQ is composed of seven domains
with distinct moral content, it was expected that a more parsimonious factor
structure would replicate better across countries. One possibility considered
was that a theoretical distinction proposed by Findlay (1961) between domains
centered on hortatory duties (defined as duties that are praised if done, but are
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not penalized if one fails to act in accordance with them) and domains centered
on minatory duties (defined as rules of strict obligation, deviation from which are
penalized) would best fit the data. Of the seven domains measured in the MAQ,
two could be considered hortatory (beneficence and compassion) and four could be
considered minatory (promise-keeping, truth-telling, fairness, and non-maleficence).
If Findlay’s conception were accurate, it is possible that two broad factors would
underlie responses to items in these six domains.
Another distinction proposed by Elster (2007) is between quasi-moral
norms (that are conditional on the behavior of others) and moral norms (that are
supposed to be unconditionally followed regardless of how others are behaving).
The only quasi-moral ethical virtue assessed by the MAQ is gratitude/reciprocity,
as it is the only virtue that is defined by behavior performed in response to the
behavior of others, in the context of specific interpersonal relationships. All of
the other ethical virtues in the MAQ do not require specific action on the part
of others to be relevant. If Elster’s theory were correct, one might expect the
gratitude/reciprocity domain to form its own factor.
In summary, based on the above considerations, I planned to test a three-
factor structure in addition to the seven-factor structure, corresponding to the
domain of hortatory ethical virtue (compassion and beneficence), minatory ethical
virtue (promise-keeping, truth-telling, fairness, and non-maleficence), and quasi-
moral ethical virtue (gratitude/reciprocity). In addition, I planned to test a one-
factor structure, since the moral domain has been modeled in other personality
inventories as a single factor. I also planned to test other factor structures based
on exploratory analyses done in a sample reserved for the purpose of developing
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models. More details on the samples used for development and cross-validation of
structural models for the MAQ are described in the Method section.
As discussed previously, these measures were also evaluated for their ability
to predict a variety of outcomes that would provide support for these measures’
validity (these outcomes included guilt and shame proneness, compassionate
norms, altruistic bravery, overall evaluation of contribution to the well-being of
others, and an objective behavior related to dutifulness). The main question of
interest was whether the seven subscales of the MAQ are redundant with already-
existing models, or whether any of these subscales predict content that is not
covered by these models. In addition, the virtues centering on helping others
(beneficence and compassion) were expected to predict the validity outcomes
related to helping others (welfare contribution, compassionate norms, altruistic
bravery) more strongly than the rule-focused ethical virtues such as promise-
keeping and fairness, while the rule-focused ethical virtues were expected to
predict the objective behavioral criterion of dutifulness more strongly.
In addition to predictive validity, the measures of ethical virtue were
evaluated for their prediction of important outcomes related to well-being (health,
meaning in life, and satisfaction with life). Though there are some philosophical
theories that suggest that the ethically virtuous should have more meaningful
lives, and higher levels of well-being (e.g., Socrates, Aristotle), there is not clear
empirical support for this notion, and an argument could be made for the opposite
relation (more virtuous people might be more likely to be taken advantage of,
and thus might have lower well-being). However, it would be an important result
if a relationship were found between ethical virtues and well-being, so these
relationships were examined for exploratory purposes.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
There were four samples of participants.
Community Sample. Members of the Eugene-Springfield Community Sample
were invited to participate in 2015. In the 2015 administration, N=538, $30
compensation, Mage=70, 98% were Non-Hispanic White, 54% (N=295) were
female.
National Sample. Personality and Priorities Study National Sample. Participants
for this sample were recruited partly by self-referral of Life and Time Study
participants when informed of the possibility of joining another study, and partly
from self-referral after completing a short screening questionnaire on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. A few also came from Craigslist ads posted strategically in
locales where a more diverse pool of applicants might be recruited. Wave 1 was
collected in 2015; Wave 2 a year later, in 2016. N=608 for Wave 1; N=499 for
Wave 2. Mage=35 for Wave 1; Mage=36 for Wave 2. In Waves 1 and 2, participants
were 66% female. In Wave 1, participants were 68% Non-Hispanic White, 10%
African-American, 10% Hispanic, 8% Asian/Asian-American, 2% Native American,
and 1% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. In Wave 2, participants were 69%
Non-Hispanic White, 11% African-American, 9% Hispanic, 9% Asian/Asian-
American, 1% Native American, and 1% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander.
Student/Informant Sample. This sample was constituted by Human Subjects
Pool participants at the University of Oregon who completed the General Survey,
from the terms: Summer and Fall 2015, Spring and Fall 2016, and Winter 2017
combined (N=1294). For this sample, undergraduates from the University of
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Oregon (Mage=19.7, SDage=2.94; 68.2% female) were asked to rate someone
they knew on expanded versions of the seven MAQ scales, intermixed with
other personality items. Approximately a quarter of participants were asked
to choose a family member, a quarter were asked to choose a friend, a quarter
were asked to choose a co-worker, and a quarter were asked to choose a romantic
partner. Participants were also asked how long they knew person they were rating,
how similar they perceived themselves to be to the person they were rating,
and demographic information about the person they were rating (age, gender,
religiosity).
International Sample. Personality and Priorities Study, International Sample
(N=910). People from four countries constituted the International Sample: India,
N=422 (31% female, Mage=31), Singapore (N=210, 53% female, Mage=38), Hong
Kong (N=59, 61% female, Mage=35), and Kenya (N=219, 32% female, Mage=24).
All questionnaires were administered in English. The locales constituting the
International Sample were selected in part due to their ability to handle English
questionnaires, avoiding the need for translated questionnaires.
Materials
Measures of Models for Ethical Virtue.
Full Moral Actions Questionnaire–Self-Report Version. To
assess ethical virtue, participants in the Community Sample, the National Sample
(Wave 1), and the Student/Informant Sample were given a self-report version of
the long form (33 items, 5-6 items per the six scales) of the MAQ developed in
2012. Participants in the National Sample (Wave 2) and the International Sample
were administered the refined 28-item version of the MAQ which included the
additional seventh Compassion scale.
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Moral Actions Questionnaire–Informant-Report Version. Two
items from each of the seven domains were also administered to informants in the
National Sample. These were exactly the same as the self-report versions, except
for minor changes in wording necessary to fit the item for informant-report. For
example, the self-report item “I see myself as someone who breaks my promises”
became “I see this person as someone who breaks his/her promises” for informant-
report. The 28-item version described above was also given in informant-report
form to the International Sample, with the instructions that participants think of
someone they admire to evaluate on these items.
HEXACO Inventory. The HEXACO personality inventory (Ashton
& Lee, 2004) captures a six-factor model and is increasingly widely used. The
60-item HEXACO inventory was administered for the Community Sample, a
shortened 40-item version was administered to the National Sample in Wave 1,
and 28 items of the HEXACO were administered to the National Sample in Wave
2. A 20-item version was also administered to the International Sample. The
primary dimension of interest for this study was Honesty/Humility, as it provides
a candidate model for ethical virtue. The full H dimension was administered even
in the shortened versions, while items relevant to the other personality dimensions
were reduced to partial versions. The other personality dimensions are less central
to the domain of ethical virtue so were not included in the current analysis.
Questionnaire Big Six Inventory. The 36-item version of the
Questionnaire Big Six (Thalmayer, Saucier, & Eigenhuis, 2011) in meta-perception
format was administered to the Community Sample, and a 30-item version was
administered to Wave 1 of the National Sample. The QB6 has been studied across
more than 25 countries, and was found to have approximately the same degree of
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fit in tests of measurement invariance across countries as the Big Five and other
contemporary inventories have across samples within the United States (Saucier
et al., 2014). The “meta-perception” format– where respondents are asked to
describe how they believe others see them (Carlson, Vazire, & Furr, 2011)– may
help eliminate some of the self-enhancement bias that could potentially occur
(particularly for valued traits) and may increase agreement between self- and
informant-reports. The H scale of the QB6 in the meta-perception format provides
a candidate model for ethical virtue.
Big Six Inventory. The 8-item Honesty/Propriety dimension
appended to the Big Five Inventory is another candidate model for ethical virtue.
Items were selected for this dimension so as to be relatively independent from the
other five dimensions in the full Big Five (John & Srivastava, 1999). Participants
were administered the full Big Six (equivalent to the Big Five plus the 8-item
Honesty/Propriety dimension) in the Community Sample, the National Sample,
and the International Sample.
Outcome Measures.
MIDUS (Midlife Development in the U.S.) 10-item Measure
of Compassionate Norms. Described in Marks and Song (2009). This scale
includes items with the stem: “Here is a list of hypothetical situations. Please rate
how much obligation you would feel if the following situations happened to you.”
The items include obligations to one’s family (e.g. “To drop your plans when your
spouse seems very troubled”), friends (e.g. “To take your friend into your home
who could not afford to live alone”), and the wider community (e.g. “To collect
contributions for heart or cancer research if asked to do so”).
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Overall Perception of Contribution to the Welfare of Others.
Additionally from the MIDUS scale, there was a single item assessing global
contribution to the welfare of others on a 0 to 10 scale: “How would you rate
your contribution to the well-being and welfare of others?” This outcome variable
was evaluated separately from the aggregated measure of compassionate norms
described above. Since it is a single item, it was expected to be more difficult to
predict than the aggregate scale scores.
Likelihood to Help a Cyclist. This was assessed using a single item
that asked about a person’s likelihood to jump out and help a cyclist who had
been hit by a car up ahead; assesses propensity for brave action. Since it is a
single item, it was expected to be more difficult to predict than the aggregate scale
scores.
Guilt and Shame Proneness, as Measured by the 16-item
GASP. Cohen, Wolf, Panter, and Insko (2011). This measure contains 8 items
measuring guilt proneness (i.e., the propensity to engage in negative behavior
evaluations and repair behaviors in response to hypothetical private transgressions)
and 8 items measuring shame proneness (i.e., the propensity to evaluate oneself
negatively and engage in withdrawal behaviors in response to hypothetical public
transgressions).
Relative Immunity from Inflation Due to Self-Enhancement.
This was evaluated by items asking people to rate the extent to which they think
they have a number of desirable but non-ethical qualities, including whether
they are someone who “is likable,” “is physically attractive,” “is competent and
effective,” “is smart and intelligent,” and “is a prominent important person.”
One explanation for a high score on a self-reported virtue assessment would be
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that truly high levels of that virtue caused the high score. A plausible alternative
explanation is that a more general self-enhancement bias inflated the score.
Assuming that there is a general tendency to “self-enhance” that does not vary
depending upon the domain of enhancement, then the extent to which the ethical
virtue’s correlation with “Has strong moral/ethical qualities” stays the same after
controlling for all these other non-moral desirable characteristics indicates to
what extent the ethical virtue is entirely unaffected by general self-enhancement
tendencies (i.e., independent from non-moral desirable qualities).
Likelihood of Returning Paid-in-Advance Survey. This is an
objective behavioral measure which was used as a validation criterion. Those
participants for whom mailing addresses were known were offered the chance to
complete a short (5-10 minute survey) for a small $5 compensation, which arrived
with the survey. Therefore, the participants had the option to take the money
and not complete the questionnaire, or to complete and return the questionnaire
to us. The choice of whether to engage in reciprocity with the research team is
the behavior of interest, not the content of the survey responses. Of course, there
are other non-moral reasons why someone might not return a questionnaire (such
as forgetfulness, being easily distracted, lack of interest, having more important
things to do) but one component is dutifulness: those high in ethical virtue
should be more dutiful and return the survey, and do so quickly. The strength
of this variable was hoped to be increased by our asking, in the short printed
questionnaire, whether the individual had a lot of leisure time at the moment,
or found the questionnaire content interesting. Among people who returned the
survey, another criterion was the time it took to return the survey; one would
expect that people who returned the survey more quickly, controlling for how busy
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they were and interest in the survey’s content, to be more virtuous than people
who returned the survey less quickly.
Health. This is a one-item measure where people are asked to rate
their perception of their health on a 5-point scale from Excellent to Poor, as in
DeSalvo, Fan, McDonell, and Fihn (2005). This measure was administered to the
Community Sample, the National Sample, and the International Sample.
Meaning in Life Scale (MILS). This is an eight-item measure from
Schnell (2009). This measure was administered to the Community Sample, the
National Sample, and the International Sample.
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS). This is a five-item measure;
see Pavot and Diener (1993). This measure was administered to the Community
Sample, the National Sample, and the International Sample.
Analysis
Preliminary analyses included a side-by-side comparison of the scale
characteristics of the MAQ and other candidate models of ethical virtue, from
the Community Sample, National Sample, and the Student/Informant Sample.
Importantly, since the final items for these scales were chosen based on their
performance in two of these samples in past work, the MAQ scales’ performance
was expected to be inflated by over-fitting to chance characteristics of these
samples. However, evaluating the MAQ scales in these same samples provided
a good baseline for comparison with their performance in other samples. As a
more fair comparison, the seven four-item MAQ scales were cross-validated in
the International Sample to see how they performed in non-U.S. populations
relative to other measures of ethical virtue, including both self-report versions and
informant-report versions identical in content.
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The main criteria that the scales were evaluated on in the International
Sample– psychometric quality, structural validity, and predictive validity– are
described in more detail below. All analyses were completed using R (R Core
Team, 2017).
Psychometric Quality. Psychometric properties of the MAQ (both
self- and informant-report versions) were evaluated separately in a subsample
from each country (internal consistency was evaluated by examining the average
item-total correlation and/or alpha (as calculated using the psych package in R
(Revelle, 2017), unidimensionality was evaluated examining the variance of the
inter-item correlations, which approaches zero as unidimensionality increases).
For comparison, H from HEXACO and H from the Big Six were also evaluated on
these criteria.
In order to determine how well the MAQ scales discriminated across all
levels of the latent trait, a one-factor Rasch (fixed item slopes) Partial Credit
Model was fit to the 28 MAQ items using the TAM package in R (Robitzsch,
Kiefer, & Wu, 2018). For comparison, the H measure from the Big Six (only
available in these data in self-report) was also evaluated on this criterion.
Test-retest stability was also evaluated for the MAQ in the National Sample
by looking at the relationship between MAQ responses in Wave 1 and MAQ
responses in Wave 2. For comparison, test-retest stability was also examined across
these two time-points for the H measure from HEXACO.
Structural Validity. One test of structural validity is convergence of
structure across methods– here, self- and informant-report methods. Structural
validity was examined by looking at the fit of Structural Equation Models for the
seven-factor MAQ self-report version, as well as the seven-factor informant-report
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version. The lavaan package in R was used to fit all structural equation models
(Rosseel, 2012).
As described in the introduction, alternative models simpler than the seven-
factor model were developed in the U.S. Community Sample (for self-report data)
and in the Student/Informant Sample (for informant-report data). The self-report
models were then cross-validated in Wave 1 of the National Sample and in the
international samples. The more parsimonious models were based in part on the
theoretically-guided distinction between hortatory, minatory, and quasi-moral
ethical virtues described in the introduction, and were also informed by results
from an EFA performed in the U.S. Community Sample (see Appendix B for
results). The pattern of factor correlations for the seven-factor CFA models in
the U.S. Community Sample was also examined to guide ideas about structure.
Since it is possible that the informant-data has a different underlying
structure than the self-report data, more parsimonious structures for the informant
data were developed separately by performing EFAs on informant data (from
the Student/Informant Sample), and also by looking at the pattern of factor
correlations in the Student/Informant Sample for the seven-factor CFA. These
structures were also cross-validated in the informant data from the international
samples.
Measurement invariance for the self-report and informant-report MAQ
models was evaluated across countries. One U.S. sample (Wave 1 of the National
Sample for self-report data and the Student/Informant Sample for informant-
report data) was also included in the measurement invariance analysis for each
data type.
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Predictive Validity. Validity for the self-report version of the MAQ
was evaluated by checking concurrent zero-order correlations of each MAQ scale
with the following outcome measures expected to be related to ethical virtue: the
MIDUS measure of compassionate norms, likelihood of helping a cyclist, overall
perception of contribution to the welfare of others, guilt-proneness and shame-
proneness as measured by GASP, and agreement with the item “I am someone
who is an ethical person” when variability due to other desirable characteristics
was removed. In addition, concurrent zero-order correlations of each MAQ scale
with the following well-being measures were evaluated: the single-item evaluation
of health status, the Meaning in Life Scale, and the Satisfaction with Life Scale.
Participants in the international samples were also asked to choose one
person they admired, and to rate that person on the MAQ. Another indication
of validity for the self-report version of the MAQ was how ethically virtuous the
person who was chosen was. The expectation was that, reflecting their ideals,
more ethically virtuous people would be more likely to choose an ethically virtuous
person as someone they admire. Further, the MAQ’s performance was compared
with the performance of alternative models of ethical virtue on the same criteria
(H from HEXACO, H from Big Six, A and C from Big Five).
The above was supplemented with a hierarchical regression. Overall,
the goal of the hierarchical regressions was to examine whether there is content
that the other candidate models of ethical virute, gleaned from already-existing
personality inventories, fail to predict, which may be better predicted by a fuller
measure of ethical virtue. Already-existing measures for ethical virtue were entered
first (A and C from the Big Five, H from Big Six, and the four H facets from
HEXACO), and it was observed whether the MAQ scales predicted the outcomes
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above and beyond what these measures predicted. The regression models were
adjusted for shrinkage in order to adjust for the advantage given to the MAQ
by the fact that it has more subscales than any other measure. Since one cannot
assume factorial invariance for all these predictors and outcomes (measurement
invariance was only evaluated for the MAQ constructs) regression analyses were
conducted within each country separately. Without factorial invariance, one
cannot assume that relationships found between constructs are comparable across
countries, so it would not make sense to examine the relationships in aggregated
data.
Forecasting power of the MAQ was examined by looking at the relationship
between MAQ scores in Wave 1 of the National Sample and an objective measure
of ethical virtue evaluated in Wave 2 of the National Sample which was not used
to select items for each domain– Time to return a paid-in-advance survey. The
first criterion was whether people higher in ethical virtue were more likely to
return the survey at all. The second criterion was evaluated among people who
returned the survey, using a regression analysis to see whether the time it took
to return the survey (as indicated by postmark date) predicted ethical virtue,
controlling for how much people enjoyed filling out the survey, and how busy
people reported they were. Controlling for these other factors that may potentially
affect time-to-return for the survey was expected to give a clearer picture of
whether the sense of dutifulness that compels people to return the survey is
uniquely related to ethical virtue as we have measured it. Since time-to-return
for the survey was positively skewed (most returns coming soon after receipt of the
survey), it was transformed with log10 function to reduce the extent of the skew.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Data Cleaning Procedure
Beneath some threshold for completion time, respondents might be assumed
to be responding impossibly fast, perhaps instead reflecting careless responding.
Using a one-second-per-item threshold, from the Kenya, India, Hong Kong, and
Singapore samples, cases were removed where participants took less than 109
seconds to complete the 109 self-report BFI items. Since the National Sample
had 118 BFI items to complete, cases were eliminated where participants took
less than 118 seconds to complete the 118 items. This criteria resulted in 11
cases in Hong Kong being eliminated (17% of original sample), 116 cases in India
being eliminated (27% of the original sample), 43 cases in Kenya being eliminated
(17% of original sample), 61 cases in Singapore being eliminated (29% of original
sample), and 72 cases in the National Sample being eliminated (12% of original
sample). Cases were also eliminated which had a standard deviation of less than .5
in their BFI responses, which resulted in an additional 5 cases from India but no
more cases eliminated from any other country. After eliminating these cases, across
all five countries the final sample had 1256 participants (N=536 in the National
Sample, N=149 in Singapore Sample, N=205 in the Kenya Sample, N=312 in
the India Sample, N=54 in the Hong Kong Sample). In these 1256 remaining
participants, the majority of participants (99%) had no missing data in the 108
BFI items that were shared across the five countries; 2 participants had 2 missing
data points out of the relevant 108 BFI items, 1 participant had two missing
responses, and 7 participants had 1 missing response.
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Since the majority of participants in the Singapore Sample indicated that
they were of Chinese ethnicity (79.5% or 167 out of 210 for the full sample, and
75.8% or 113 out of 149 for the cleaned data) and the Hong Kong Sample was so
small (and 81% indicated they were of Chinese ethnicity), the Singapore Sample
was combined with the Hong Kong Sample for all analyses.
Psychometric Quality
In general, alpha was low for the MAQ scales in self-report data, but higher
for informant-report data (see Tables 1 and 4). In particular, Beneficence, Non-
Maleficence and Compassion would benefit from having more items to increase
alpha. Though alpha values for the MAQ scales were lower than the Big Six-H and
HEXACO-H, the mean inter-item correlations tended to be higher or similar as
those for Big Six-H and HEXACO-H in self-report data (see Table 2). Exceptions
were Compassion and Truth-Telling, which would benefit from having a different
set of items with higher internal consistency. The MAQ scales with the best
reliability across countries and methods (self- and informant-report) were Promise-
Keeping and Fairness (see Tables 1, 2, 4, and 5). However, especially in the Kenya
and India informant samples, these scales were more multi-dimensional than is
desirable (see Tables 3 and 6).
HEXACO- H had the best internal consistency across countries in self-
report data, but was weaker on unidimensionality across countries. MAQ-
Compassion and MAQ-Gratitude/Reciprocity were also more multidimensional
than is desirable, in both self- and informant-report data.
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Table 1. Standardized α for self-report scales in each country
Compas Bene NonM Fair Truth Prom Grat BSix-H HEX-H Meta-H
U.S. (Com) .549 .648 .504 .578 .485 .680 .668 .673 .706 .636
U.S. (Nat) .594 .770 .659 .631 .535 .753 .713 .623 .763
Kenya .369 .378 .551 .687 .094 .613 .603 .560 .723
Sing/HK .320 .567 .464 .646 .348 .680 .563 .560 .694
India .330 .417 .429 .547 .138 .656 .516 .571 .643
Note. In bold are coefficients that are greater than .7, a common threshold for acceptability
Table 2. Mean of inter-item correlations for self-report scales in each country
Compas Bene NonM Fair Truth Prom Grat BSix-H HEX-H Meta-H
U.S. (Com) .233 .315 .203 .255 .190 .347 .335 .205 .193 .225
U.S. (Nat) .268 .455 .326 .300 .224 .432 .453 .171 .244
Kenya .128 .132 .235 .354 .025 .284 .276 .137 .207
Sing/HK .105 .247 .178 .314 .118 .347 .244 .137 .185
India .110 .152 .158 .232 .039 .323 .211 .142 .153
Table 3. Variance of inter-item correlations for self-report scales in each country
Compas Bene NonM Fair Truth Prom Grat BSix-H HEX-H Meta-H
U.S. (Com) .003 .003 .009 .006 .006 .005 .018 .006 .010 .005
U.S. (Nat) .006 .004 .007 .009 .006 .009 .010 .017 .015
Kenya .021 .012 .010 .011 .012 .035 .021 .010 .027
Sing/HK .011 .012 .009 .017 .017 .023 .059 .015 .016
India .025 .015 .015 .023 .010 .012 .019 .023 .020
Note. In bold are coefficients that are less than .010
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Table 4. Standardized α for informant-report MAQ scales in each country
Compas Bene NonM Fair Truth Prom Grat
U.S. (Student/Informant) .660 .700 .720 .752 .371 .782 .793
Kenya (Informant) .513 .344 .538 .709 .180 .692 .621
Sing/HK (Informant) .696 .680 .646 .725 .381 .797 .731
India (Informant) .478 .479 .488 .629 .088 .730 .631
Notes. International informant data does not include the full Big Six scale (only 5 of the 8 items)
nor does it include items from HEXACO H, which is why only MAQ scales are listed here. In
bold are coefficients that are greater than or equal to .7.
Table 5. Mean of inter-item correlations for informant-report MAQ scales in each
country
Compas Bene NonM Fair Truth Prom Grat
U.S. (Student/Informant) .327 .368 .391 .432 .129 .473 .490
Kenya (Informant) .209 .116 .225 .379 .052 .360 .290
Sing/HK (Informant) .365 .347 .314 .397 .134 .495 .404
India (Informant) .186 .187 .192 .298 .024 .403 .300
Table 6. Variance of inter-item correlations for informant-report MAQ scales in
each country
Compas Bene NonM Fair Truth Prom Grat
U.S. (Student/Informant) .007 .007 .001 .008 .010 .011 .005
Kenya (Informant) .035 .015 .003 .025 .033 .030 .019
Sing/HK (Informant) .003 .003 .005 .028 .004 .011 .021
India (Informant) .011 .006 .012 .031 .013 .009 .016
Notes. In bold are coefficients that are less than .010. For the U.S. informant sample, N ranged
from 1022 for the Compassion scale to 1371 for the Truth-Telling measure (based on which items
were available from each term of the General Survey).
Test-Retest Stability. Test-retest stability of the MAQ was
comparable to that of Honesty/Humility of the HEXACO inventory (see Table
7). Not surprisingly, the aggregate scales generally had better cross-time stability
than the subscales composed as little as 2 items in the case of some of the
HEXACO scales and as many as 4 items for each MAQ scale. The Pearson
correlations between Wave 1 and Wave 2 MAQ subscales ranged from .63 (for
Non-Maleficence) to .75 for Beneficence, and even the scales with low internal
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consistency showed good test-retest stability. The HEXACO facets’ test-retest
stability ranged from .50 for Sincerity to .81 for Fairness.
Table 7. One-year retest stability for MAQ and HEXACO-H in National Sample
r 95% CI df
MAQ Beneficence .75 [.71, .79] 494
MAQ Non-Maleficence .63 [.57, .68] 494
MAQ Fairness .71 [.66, .75] 493
MAQ Truth-Telling .67 [.62, .71] 494
MAQ Promise-Keeping .68 [.63, .72] 494
MAQ Gratitude .64 [.59, .69] 494
MAQ Compassion .68 [.63, .73] 494
MAQ Tolerance .67 [.62, .72] 494
MAQ Total .81 [.78, .84] 493
HEX Fairness .81 [.74, .87] 109
HEX Sincerity .50 [.35, .63] 109
HEX Greed Avoidance .70 [.59, .79] 109
HEX Modesty .64 [.52, .74] 109
HEXACO H .83 [.76, .88] 109
Item Response Theory (IRT). The main goal of the IRT analysis
was to examine the distribution of person estimates on the latent moral trait as
estimated using the full MAQ inventory, and as estimated using the H scale from
the Big Six. One question was the extent to which the rank-ordering of people
would be consistent across the two measures. In addition, the distribution of
person estimates was examined for each by country to see whether there were
systematic differences in the distributions of the latent trait (as estimated by the
MAQ inventory or the H scale from the Big Six) across countries.
Since the MAQ was not sufficiently invariant across countries (see
Structural Validity results below), in the aggregated International Sample,
parameters in the IRT Rasch family PCM were estimated separately for each
country. The model was anchored using one MAQ item considered to be invariant,
which was chosen based on its relatively small differences in means across 33
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different countries found in Saucier et al. (2015): “I would never take things that
arent mine.”
For the whole 28-item MAQ inventory, overall EAP (expected a priori)
reliability in self-reported data was .864 (weighted likelihood estimate or WLE
reliability was .858). For the H inventory, overall EAP reliability was .587 in self-
reported data (WLE reliability was .541). For the informant-rated MAQ inventory,
the overall EAP reliability was .913 (WLE reliability .911).
The distribution of scores across countries was comparable in self-reported
data for the latent trait when estimated using the MAQ inventory and the latent
trait when estimated using the Big Six H scale (see Figures 1, 2, and 5). However,
the distribution as estimated using the MAQ did show slightly more peakedness
in Kenya in self-report data, and in both Kenya and India in informant-report
data, compared to the other countries, whereas the latent trait estimated using the
Big Six-H self-report was distributed more similarly across countries. In addition,
though the distributions of the theta estimates for the three measures look fairly
similar, they do not match perfectly in their rank-ordering of people on the latent
trait– the correlation between the rank-orderings is r=.66, 95% CI [.63, .69],
t(1254)=31.28, p<.05. This lack of agreement could be due in part to the higher
person-error for the H dimension, and also due to the fact that they are measuring
similar but not completely overlapping traits.
Another useful way to look at how well the measure is doing across all
levels of the latent trait is to look at the relationship between the SE and Theta.
It appears that both inventories result in more measurement error for higher levels
of the latent trait (see Figures 3 and 4). This is also true for the informant-ratings
(see Figure 6).
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Figure 1. Distribution of Theta estimates using MAQ inventory in self-report data
by country
Figure 2. Distribution of Theta estimates using 8-item Big Six H in self-report
data by country
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Figure 3. Relationship between Theta and SE for MAQ inventory in self-report
data
Figure 4. Relationship between Theta and SE for Big Six H in self-report data
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Figure 5. Distribution of Theta estimates using MAQ inventory in informant data
by country
Figure 6. Relationship between Theta and SE for informant-rated MAQ inventory
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Structural Validity
Structure in Self-Report Data. A seven-factor model corresponding
to each of the seven MAQ domains was tested in the Community Sample. Fit was
good for the seven-factor model (see Table 9). However, the factor correlations
were used to inform a simpler structure that could be tested in the international
samples, due to the potential for model estimation problems that can arise
when factors are highly correlated. The pattern of factor correlations (see Table
8) roughly corresponded to a three-factor structure based on the distinction
between hortatory/supererogatory ethical duties (praised if done, but no strict
ethical obligation to perform: Beneficence, Compassion), minatory ethical duties
(ethical duties of strict obligation: Fairness, Non-Maleficence, Truth-Telling,
Promise-Keeping), and quasi-moral duties (duties that are conditional on the
behavior of others: Gratitude/Reciprocity). However, if one relaxes the assumption
that the factor structure should conform to a simple structure, the pattern of
correlations and item-level EFA in the training set (U.S. Community Sample)
more closely resembled a model where Non-Maleficence and Gratitude/Reciprocity
are interstitial to the broader factor centering on hortatory duties (could also be
interpreted as a factor centering on care), and the broader factor centering on
minatory duties (could also be interpreted as a factor centering on justice, or
deontological ethical principles). For this reason, a four-factor model was tested
in which Gratitude/Reciprocity and Non-Maleficence were kept separate from
these two broader factors. An “Interstitial” model was also tested, where the items
were specified to load on two broad factors corresponding to Care and Justice.
For this model, Compassion and Beneficence items loaded only on Care, Promise-
Keeping, Truth-Telling, and Fairness items were allowed to load only on Justice,
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and Gratitude/Reciprocity and Non-Maleficence items were allowed to load on
both these factors (i.e., as interstitial between the factors).
In addition, since the moral domain has been modeled in other personality
inventories as a single factor and most factor correlations were relatively high, a
one-factor model was tested in the international samples.
In the Community Sample, the seven-factor model had the best fit of
the models; fit was generally better the more factors the model had (see Table
9). However, the two-factor interstitial model had similar fit to the three-factor
models.
Table 8. Estimated factor correlation matrix for seven-factor model in U.S.
(Community Sample) data
Compas Bene NonMal Grat Truth Fair
Compas - - - - - -
Bene .783 - - - - -
NonMal .763 .788 - - - -
Grat .377 .658 .617 - - -
Truth .360 .393 .638 .421 - -
Fair .490 .598 .820 .627 .850 -
Promise .226 .342 .588 .573 .543 .719
Table 9. Fit of seven-, three-, and one-factor models in Community Sample
# factors Chi-square df CFI AIC BIC RMSEA SRMR
Seven 757.72 329 .846 32731.38 32813.62 .05 .055
Four 906.245 344 .798 32849.904 33112.922 .056 .061
Three* 950.181 347 .784 32887.841 33138.132 .058 .064
Three** 982.345 347 .772 32920.005 33170.296 .06 .065
One 1292.063 350 .662 33223.723 33461.287 .072 .072
Interstitial*** 1002.0126 341 .763 32951.686 33227.43 .061 .061
Notes. *For this three-factor model, Non-Maleficence was grouped with Compassion and
Beneficence (consistent with the distinction between moral duties centering on not
harming/benefiting individual others and moral duties centering on following moral principles–
this is the model that was most consistent with results from the item-level EFA). **For the
second three-factor model, Non-Maleficence was grouped with Fairness, Promise-Keeping, and
Truth-Telling (consistent with distinction between minatory and hortatory duties). ***For the
interstitial model, items were specified to load on two broad factors corresponding to Care and
Justice: Compassion and Beneficence items loaded on one factor, Promise-Keeping, Truth-Telling,
and Fairness items loaded on the other factor, and Gratitude/Reciprocity and Non-Maleficence
items were allowed to load on both these factors.
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Next these models were cross-validated in the international samples
and the U.S. National Sample. A seven-factor model was tested in the Hong
Kong/Singapore Sample, the Kenya Sample, the India Sample, and the National
Sample. Latent variables were scaled by setting their factor variances to 1. In all
four samples, the covariance matrix of latent variables was not positive definite.
For the four-factor model, only Kenya had a latent variable covariance matrix that
was not positive definite (NPD). Both three-factor models successfully ran in all
countries (without NPD matrices), and the one-factor and interstitial models also
successfully ran in all countries.
For the three-factor model, fit was poorest in India (CFI=.577), followed by
Hong Kong/Singapore (CFI=.613), Kenya (CFI=.738), and finally the National
Sample (CFI= .758). Fit did not decrease enough from the three-factor to the one-
factor model to warrant retaining three factors in Kenya and India (see Table 10);
however, fit did worsen considerably for all indices in the Hong Kong/Singapore
Sample for the one-factor model relative to the three-factor model.
If one were to choose a three-factor model, which would make the
most sense to choose? In other words, is there more empirical support for a
model differentiating minatory and hortatory duties, or one differentiating care
and justice? Across countries, the three-factor model corresponding to the
latter distinction had a slight advantage compared to the three-factor model
corresponding to the prior distinction, but this difference is fairly small. It is also
possible that the Non-Maleficence scale ended up measuring manners or etiquette,
which would more clearly fit with the more care-based moral duties than the
minatory duties (one of the four items is “Is sometimes rude to others”).
37
The interstitial model only did better than the three-factor models in
India, and not much better even there. In general, though the scale correlations
suggested a rough interstitial structure, it appears that there is no advantage to
modeling these factors interstitially at the item-level. This was also true in the
Community Sample, where these models were all developed.
If one were interested in defining country-specific models for ethical virtues
rather than a model that generalizes across countries, the current data suggested
that a model differentiating multiple dimensions of ethical virtue may fit best in
Hong Kong/Singapore and the U.S., but did not have much advantage over a
simple one-factor model in India and Kenya. In Kenya, fit indices were all about
the same for each model, suggesting no structural benefit of modeling ethical
virtue with more than one factor; in India, the interstitial model fit slightly better
according to CFI, RMSEA and AIC, but was about equal to the other models
according to SRMR and BIC. In contrast, in the four-factor model was better by
all fit indices in the U.S. National Sample, and the four-factor model was best by
CFI in Hong Kong/Singapore (other models with multiple dimensions fit about
as well in Hong Kong/Singapore, but the worst model was clearly the one-factor
model, suggesting a structural advantage to at least some differentiation of the
domains). Though the pattern of correlations did not warrant modeling the MAQ
as multiple dimensions in Kenya and India, more dimensions may still aid in
prediction in these countries; future research could examine whether the increased
differentiation provided by a model with more than one dimension has a predictive
advantage, even if there is no benefit in terms of model fit.
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Table 10. Fit indices for models in self-report data across countries
Country Model Chi-square df CFI AIC BIC RMSEA SRMR
Kenya Four NPD - - - - - -
Three* 693.68 321 .738 16125.240 16314.652 .075 .086
Three** 692.586 321 .739 16124.146 16313.558 .075 .086
One 705.329 324 .732 16130.889 16310.332 .076 .086
Interstitial 733.955 341 .734 16697.560 16913.238 .075 .085
India Four 1202.747 318 .580 23707.489 23932.069 .094 .114
Three* 1211.201 321 .577 23709.943 23923.294 .094 .113
Three** 1215.976 321 .575 23714.718 23928.069 .095 .113
One 1240.844 324 .564 23733.586 23935.708 .095 .113
Interstitial 1214.963 341 .598 24567.824 24811.119 .091 .114
HK/Sing Four 796.281 318 .637 13296.558 13495.351 .086 .088
Three* 829.679 321 .613 13323.956 13512.809 .088 .091
Three** 807.679 321 .630 13301.956 13490.809 .086 .088
One 938.752 324 .533 13427.030 13605.943 .097 .095
Interstitial 880.881 341 .598 13835.338 14050.696 .088 .089
U.S. (Nat) Four 1202.601 318 .789 36671.434 36928.146 .072 .071
Three* 1339.692 321 .758 36802.525 37046.401 .077 .078
Three** 1320.238 321 .762 36783.071 37026.947 .076 .077
One 1904.341 324 .624 37361.174 37592.214 .096 .089
Interstitial 1340.767 316 .756 36813.600 37078.869 .078 .072
Notes. No fit indices are listed for the four-factor model in Kenya because there, the latent
variable covariance matrix of this model was not positive definite. Three* factor model is the
version where Non-Maleficence was grouped with Fairness, Promise-Keeping, and Truth-Telling.
Three** factor model is the version where Non-Maleficence was grouped with Compassion and
Beneficence.
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Measurement Invariance Tests Across Hong Kong/Singapore,
India, Kenya, and National Sample. For the models that successfully ran
across all countries, measurement invariance tests were conducted to determine
to what extent scale scores can be used to make inferences about relationships
between MAQ virtue scales and other constructs across countries.
For all models, there was a moderate drop in all fit indices except for BIC
going from the configural model to the factorial model, but an even larger drop
from the factorial model to the scalar model (see Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14); this
means that the items cannot be assumed to relate to the factors in the same way
across countries, and further, item means are not comparable across countries. Of
note, the BIC index did suggest the best model was the factorial model, but this
was the only fit index indicating this. Like AIC, BIC penalizes model complexity,
but does so to a larger degree than AIC. Since all other fit indices (including
RMSEA, which also includes a penalty for more complex models) indicated that
the factorial model fit worse than the configural model, and the configural model
itself did not meet standard thresholds for acceptable fit, it is best to assume no
level of invariance holds.
Table 11. Measurement invariance tests for three-factor model (version where Non-
Maleficence was grouped with Fairness, Promise-Keeping, and Truth-Telling) in
self-report data
Chi-square Df CFI AIC BIC RMSEA SRMR
Configural 4074.251 1284 .691 90177.664 91902.451 .083 .087
Factorial 4415.712 1365 .663 90357.125 91666.115 .084 .110
Scalar* 5703.790 1437 .528 91501.203 92440.596 .097 .120
*For scalar test, model in India had a not positive definite (NPD) latent variable covariance
matrix
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Table 12. Measurement invariance tests for three-factor model (version where Non-
Maleficence was grouped with Compassion and Beneficence) in self-report data
Chi-square Df CFI AIC BIC RMSEA SRMR
Configural 4036.479 1284 .696 90139.892 91864.680 .083 .086
Factorial 4387.882 1365 .666 90329.295 91638.285 .084 .109
Scalar* 5677.108 1437 .531 91474.521 92413.914 .097 .119
*For scalar test, model in India was NPD
Table 13. Measurement invariance tests for one-factor model in self-report data
Chi-square Df CFI AIC BIC RMSEA SRMR
Configural 4789.266 1296 .614 90868.679 92531.867 .093 .092
Factorial 5158.237 1377 .582 91075.650 92323.041 .094 .115
Scalar 6446.980 1455 .448 92208.393 93055.386 .105 .127
Table 14. Measurement invariance tests for interstitial model in self-report data
Chi-square Df CFI AIC BIC RMSEA SRMR
Configural 4011.056 1264 .696 90154.469 91981.922 .083 .085
Factorial 4458.007 1366 .658 90397.420 91701.277 .085 .109
Scalar 5743.089 1441 .524 91532.502 92451.362 .098 .120
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Structure in Informant-Report Data. An item-level EFA in the
Student/Informant Sample was used to develop feasible models that could then be
tested in the international informant data (see Appendix B for loadings from the
EFA). The EFA suggested a similar pattern for the informant data as it did in the
self-report data–where there were broad dimensions characterized by hortatory and
minatory duties (which could also be interpreted as care and justice), and Non-
Maleficence and Gratitude/Reciprocity were interstitial to these dimensions. In the
Student/Informant Sample, the factors were even more highly correlated than in
the self-report data (see Table 15 for the factor correlation matrix). In addition to
the models tested in the self-report data, a simpler two-factor model was tested in
the informant data in which the Gratitude/Reciprocity dimension and items were
removed entirely, inasmuch as the items for this dimension loaded about equally
on both the broader dimensions. In the Student/Informant Sample, the four-factor
model performed the best but fit for all models was similar in this sample (see
Table 16).
The four-factor model had a not positive definite (NPD) latent variable
covariance matrix in India and Kenya, and both three-factor models had this same
issue in India. High correlations were estimated between all three factors in the
three-factor model across countries (see Table 18). The version of the three-factor
model where Non-Maleficence was grouped with Compassion and Beneficence also
had a NPD latent variable covariance matrix in Kenya.
The only models that successfully ran in all countries in the informant
data were the two-factor model (without Gratitude/Reciprocity) and the one-
factor model. The one-factor model fit similarly or better than the two-factor
model in India and Kenya, but the two-factor model clearly fit better in Hong
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Kong/Singapore (and in the Student/Informant Sample). See Table 17 for fit
indices for each model in each country. Measurement invariance tests showed a
similar pattern as they did in self-report data, suggesting that factorial invariance
and scalar invariance cannot be assumed (see Tables 19 and 20). As in the self-
report data, BIC indicated the factorial model had better fit than the configural
model, but again, since even configural invariance could not be assumed and the
other fit indices suggested there was a decrement in fit moving from configural to
factorial, measurement invariance on any level should not be assumed.
Table 15. Estimated factor correlation matrix in Student/Informant Sample
(where latent variable covariance matrix was not positive definite)
Compas Bene NonMal Grat Truth Fair
Compas - - - - - -
Bene .984 - - - - -
NonMal .944 .891 - - - -
Grat .772 .946 .782 - - -
Truth .751 .643 .813 .754 - -
Fair .840 .865 .888 .918 .938 -
Promise .578 .758 .681 .828 .682 .860
Table 16. Fit of models in Student/Informant Sample
# factors Chi-square df CFI AIC BIC RMSEA SRMR
Seven (NPD) - - - - - - -
Four 1906.787 344 .831 62288.862 62582.48 .073 .059
Three* 1953.564 347 .826 62329.639 62609.05 .074 .060
Three** 2079.537 347 .813 62455.612 62735.024 .077 .062
Two**** 1645.915 251 .822 60836.833 61074.281 .077 .062
One 2282.652 350 .791 62652.727 62917.931 .081 .063
Interstitial*** 1930.088 341 .828 62318.163 62625.989 .074 .059
Notes. *For the first three-factor model, Non-Maleficence was grouped with Fairness,
Promise-Keeping, and Truth-Telling (consistent with the distinction between minatory and
hortatory duties). **For the second three-factor model, Non-Maleficence was grouped with
Compassion and Beneficence, consistent with the distinction between moral duties centering on
not harming/benefiting individual others (care) and moral duties centering on following moral
principles (justice). ***For the interstitial model, items were specified to load on two broad
factors corresponding to care and justice; Compassion and Beneficence items loaded on one
factor, Promise-Keeping, Truth-Telling, and Fairness items loaded on the other factor, and
Gratitude/Reciprocity and Non-Maleficence items were allowed to load on both these
factors.****The two-factor model did not include the Gratitude/Reciprocity factor or items, and
had two broad factors that could be interpreted as care and justice.
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Table 17. Fit indices for models in informant-report data across countries
Model Chi-square df CFI AIC BIC RMSEA SRMR
India Four NPD - - - - - -
Three* NPD - - - - - -
Three** NPD - - - - - -
Two 943.831 251 .713 21573.642 21757.049 .094 .099
One 1253.571 350 .706 24843.735 25053.164 .091 .097
Interstitial 1144.879 341 .739 24753.044 24996.13 .087 .096
HK/Sing Four 823.427 344 .789 14458.758 14663.563 .083 .074
Three* 835.474 347 .785 14464.806 14659.701 .084 .074
Three** 855.155 347 .776 14484.486 14679.381 .085 .076
Two 588.648 251 .811 12596.853 12758.715 .082 .071
One 948.590 350 .736 14571.922 14756.907 .092 .076
Interstitial 821.950 341 .788 14463.282 14677.996 .084 .073
Kenya Four NPD - - - - - -
Three* NPD - - - - - -
Three** 810.237 347 .734 16600.777 16795.082 .082 .087
Two 640.263 251 .721 14420.477 14581.849 .088 .091
One 819.162 350 .731 16603.701 16788.126 .082 .087
Interstitial - - - - - - -
Notes. In Kenya, the standard errors of the interstitial model could not be computed. *For the
first three-factor model, Non-Maleficence was grouped with Fairness, Promise-Keeping, and
Truth-Telling (consistent with the distinction between minatory and hortatory duties). **For the
second three-factor model, Non-Maleficence was grouped with Compassion and Beneficence,
consistent with the distinction between moral duties centering on not harming/benefiting
individual others (care) and moral duties centering on following moral principles (justice).
Table 18. Estimated factor correlation matrix for three-factor model in each
country
Hort-Mina Hort-Grat Mina-Grat
U.S. (Student/Informant) .864 .872 .908
India (informant) .850 .986 .995
HK/Sing (informant) .823 .902 .796
Kenya (informant) .909 .968 .942
Note. Hort-Mina refers to the correlation between Hortatory and Minatory factors, Hort-Grat
refers to the correlation between Hortatory and Gratitude/Reciprocity factors, and Mina-Grat
refers to the correlation between Minatory and Gratitude/Reciprocity factors.
Table 19. Measurement invariance tests for two-factor model in informant-report
data
Chi-square Df CFI AIC BIC RMSEA SRMR
Configural 3818.657 1004 .791 109619.806 111199.451 .082 .071
Factorial 4261.161 1076 .763 109918.310 111108.453 .085 .091
Scalar 5429.547 1142 .681 110954.696 111298.563 .095 .101
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Table 20. Measurement invariance tests for one-factor model in informant-report
data
Chi-square Df CFI AIC BIC RMSEA SRMR
Configural 5303.975 1400 .761 118896.085 120692.994 .085 .072
Factorial 5763.134 1484 .738 119187.245 120534.926 .086 .093
Scalar 7130.246 1565 .659 120392.356 121306.855 .096 .103
Predictive Validity
The main research question this section addresses is how various candidate
measures for ethical virtue (Agreeableness and Conscientiousness from the Big
Five, the appended Honesty dimension to the Big Five, the four HEXACO facets,
and the seven MAQ subscales) compared in their prediction of outcomes– are
they mainly redundant with one another, or are some of them stronger predictors
where others fall short? Across all outcomes, which ethical virtue measures are the
strongest predictors?
To answer this main research question, hierarchical regression analyses were
used, entering measures for ethical virtue in successive order for each outcome
(see Figure 7). Model 1 predicted the outcomes with only Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness scales from the Big Five; if there were an increase from 0 for
Model 1 and a flat line after, this would suggest the ethical virtue model gleaned
from the Big Five is the best we have for predicting for these outcomes. This
would imply the more recent attempts at integrating moral content into models
of personality are not useful for predicting these outcomes in these samples. It
does appear that Model 1 predicts variation in these outcomes, but the line is not
flat after Model 1, suggesting a benefit of not relying solely on the Big Five.
Model 2 adds the Honesty/Propriety scale that was appended to the Big
Five. With the exception of guilt proneness, adding the H scale does not generally
aid in prediction of outcomes above and beyond Big Five Agreeableness and
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Figure 7. Adjusted R-squared for hierarchical models predicting each outcome
Notes. Model 1’s predictors include only Big Five Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness. Model 2’s predictors add the H scale appended to the Big Five.
Model 3’s predictors add the four H HEXACO facets (Sincerity, Fairness, Greed
Avoidance, and Modesty). Model 4’s predictors add the seven MAQ subscales
(Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, Compassion, Fairness, Truth-Telling,
Promise-Keeping, and Gratitude/Reciprocity).
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Conscientiousness. The H scale does aid in predicting health, meaning in life,
and satisfaction with life, but only in India. The general lack of added benefit to
using the H scale to predict outcomes may be due to the fact that the ethical-
virtue validity outcomes chosen for this study are more about helping others
than following ethical rules, a core component of Agreeableness rather than
Honesty/Propriety.
Model 3 adds the four HEXACO facets, and Model 4 adds the seven MAQ
subscales. Increases in adjusted R-squared for Models 3 and 4 may suggest an
advantage for facet models (confounded with any strengths of these particular
inventories), as these are the only inventories used here which are modeled at
the facet level rather than as broad domains. And any increases observed in
adjusted R-squared from Model 3 to Model 4 indicate that the MAQ subscales
confer an advantage over the HEXACO facets. It does appear as though there
is a modest general advantage to modeling ethical virtues using facets. For the
HEXACO facets in particular, predictive power is gained in some countries for
some outcomes (satisfaction with life and guilt proneness in all countries, health
and compassionate norms in Kenya only).
The results for Model 4 suggest the MAQ subscales sometimes confer
an additional advantage equal to or greater than that conferred by adding the
HEXACO facets. The MAQ aids in prediction of altruistic bravery and guilt
proneness across all countries. The MAQ also aids in prediction of compassionate
norms in Hong Kong/Singapore and the U.S., health in Hong Kong/Singapore,
and meaning in life and satisfaction with life in all countries except India.
In summary, the results from the hierarchical regressions suggest that
a fuller measure of ethical virtue, derived from a rationale-driven approach to
47
identifying ethical virtues, did have an advantage in predicting relevant outcomes.
This cannot solely be explained by the advantage conferred by using facets, as the
HEXACO inventory was modeled with facets and the MAQ aids in prediction even
above HEXACO facets.
Though sheer predictive power is a useful criterion in itself, to more fully
evaluate validity, it is also important to determine 1) whether the relationships are
in the expected direction, 2) whether the pattern of relationships is as expected,
in terms of relative magnitude (discriminant validity), 3) even if the expected
relationships are found, support for validity can be strengthened by attempting to
rule out alternative explanations for these relationships such as socially desirable
responding, and 4) given the study from Westfall and Yarkoni (2016), whether the
results showing incremental validity still hold when measurement error is taken
into account.
With respect to 1), most correlations were in the direction expected.
However, as 2) mentions, to further bolster support for these inventories’ validity,
it is also important to determine to what extent the relative magnitude of pattern
of correlations is what was expected (discriminant validity). One prediction was
that the virtues centering on helping others (Beneficence and Compassion) should
predict the validity outcomes related to helping others (welfare contribution,
compassionate norms, altruistic bravery) more strongly than the rule-focused
ethical virtues such as Promise-Keeping and Fairness. These predictions were
roughly confirmed in the U.S. National Sample. In the U.S. National Sample,
Beneficence was the virtue that was the most strongly related to compassionate
norms, welfare contribution and altruistic bravery, while Truth-Telling and
Promise-Keeping were the most weakly related. Though not predicted, it is
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interesting to note that guilt proneness was the outcome with the most consistent
relations across all the ethical virtues.
Similarly, in Hong Kong/Singapore, Beneficence was the virtue most highly
related to the validity outcomes focused on helping others, and guilt proneness
showed a more consistent relationship with all the ethical virtues. In Kenya and
India, there was a different pattern. In Kenya, Fairness, Non-Maleficence, and
Gratitude/Reciprocity were most strongly related to welfare contribution, guilt
proneness, and altruistic bravery, but Beneficence was most strongly related to
compassionate norms. In India, Non-Maleficence and Promise-Keeping were the
most strongly related to the outcomes having to do with helping others; guilt
proneness again was consistently related to all virtues, but most strongly related
to Gratitude/Reciprocity.
With respect to 3), there was some evidence that some correlations
were inflated by socially desirable responding, particularly in the international
samples. In India, the MAQ aggregate scale did relate more strongly than the
HEXACO-H domain scale to the ethical virtue outcomes predicted a priori to be
related (welfare contribution, compassionate norms, altruistic bravery, and guilt
proneness). Though the MAQ-total score overall predicted outcomes more strongly
than HEXACO-H, it is also the case that the correlation between the total MAQ
score and the item “is an ethical/moral person” was more highly attenuated for
the MAQ when other desirable characteristics are taken into account than for
HEXACO-H, suggesting that socially desirable responding may play a role for
the MAQ more than for the HEXACO-H. This is not surprising given that the
items in the HEXACO are framed as hypothetical situations; responding in a
less virtuous way does not actually require one to directly admit that one has a
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tendency to violate ethical standards, just that one would be tempted to do so if
the opportunity arose.
In Hong Kong/Singapore and Kenya, the MAQ again generally tended to
have stronger correlations with the validity outcomes than HEXACO-H, and often
comparable correlations with the validity outcomes as the Big Six scales, but both
MAQ and the Big Six scales showed larger drops in the correlation with “is an
ethical/moral person” once other desirable characteristics were controlled for, while
the correlation between HEXACO-H and this item were not affected as much.
In the U.S. National Sample, the zero-order correlations between the
aggregate MAQ score and the ethical virtue outcomes were clearly higher than
those for the other ethical virtue measures. Further, since the correlation between
“is an ethical/moral person” was not attenuated much when other correlations
were controlled for, socially desirable responding is a less likely explanation for
the MAQ’s superior prediction of validity outcomes. In summary: although the
MAQ generally predicts outcomes better than HEXACO, the relation between the
MAQ scales and outcomes may at least in part be inflated by socially desirable
responding in the international samples, which is less the case in the U.S. National
Sample.
With respect to 4), the hierarchical regressions were also run using SEM
so that measurement error could be incorporated into the models. Westfall and
Yarkoni (2016) found that incremental validity claims often do not hold up
once measurement error is taken into account, and counter-intuitively, this is
particularly true when reliability is moderate rather than very low or very high.
Since it was not possible to model these highly correlated scales as latent variables
without arriving at NPD latent variable covariance matrices, following Bollen
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(2009), scale scores were used as indicators for each scale, and measurement
error was explicitly incorporated into the model by setting the variance of the
error term corresponding to the latent variable underlying that scale equal to
(1-α)*var(scale), where α was the empirical α estimate for that scale in that
particular sample. Unfortunately, these models only ran without estimation
problems in the National Sample, and even there only the four models with the
multiple-item outcomes (meaning in life, satisfaction with life, guilt proneness,
and compassionate norms) converged without estimation problems. For those four
outcomes, the percentage of variance explained by the predictors in each outcome
looked similar to the results for the models assuming no measurement error (See
Figure 8).
For the international samples, participants were asked to rate someone who
they admire on the MAQ, so one final validity indicator for the MAQ was whether
people who are themselves higher in ethical virtue tended to admire people who
are also higher in ethical virtue. There was a strong to moderate correlation
between self-reported aggregate MAQ score and informant-rated aggregate MAQ
score in all three samples: in India, people with higher aggregate self-reported
MAQ scores also tended to admire people who they rated as being higher in MAQ
virtue, r=.72, t(309)=18.06, p<.05; in Kenya, r=.66, t(196)=12.30, p<.05; in
Hong Kong/Singapore, r=.35, t(199)=5.24, p<.05. The finding that people higher
in ethical virtue tended to admire people who were also higher in ethical virtue is
consistent with past research by Schlenker, Weigold, and Schlenker (2008) which
found that people higher in integrity tended to have heroes with moral qualities
(principled, benevolent, and spiritual) while the heroes of people who were lower in
integrity tended to have heroes with admirable qualities unrelated to morality.
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Figure 8. R-squared estimates for the regression model assuming no measurement
error and SEM regression model.
Notes. Model 1’s predictors include only Big Five Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness. Model 2’s predictors add the H scale appended to the Big Five.
Model 3’s predictors add the four H HEXACO facets (Sincerity, Fairness, Greed
Avoidance, and Modesty). Model 4’s predictors add the seven MAQ subscales
(Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, Compassion, Fairness, Truth-Telling,
Promise-Keeping, and Gratitude/Reciprocity). For the ethical-virtue scales, the
amount of variance due to measurement error was explicitly added to the model
and was calculated based on each scale’s alpha estimate in the U.S. National
Sample. All outcomes were modeled as latent variables.
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Table 21. Zero-order correlations between ethical virtue scales and outcomes in U.S. National Sample
Welfare Comp Guilt Shame Altruist MIL SWL Health Ident Ident
Contrib Norms Prone Prone Bravery Ethical Ethical
(- Desir)
Big Six-H .13 .20* .44* .16* .21* .22* .17* .09 .44* .40*
Big Six-A .36* .36* .37* .05 .34* .45* .30* .22* .37* .33*
Big Six-C .22* .20* .25* -.10 .26* .36* .28* .28* .35* .27*
HEX- H (domain) .15* .18* .45* .09 .20* .16* .11 .03 .31* .30*
HEX- Sincerity .09 .13 .25* .03 .14 .02 .02 -.03 .13 .13
HEX- Fairness .24* .25* .55* .13 .21* .29* .20* .11 .41* .36*
HEX- Greed .08 .08 .09 -.06 .03 .09 .13 .00 .09 .11
HEX- Modesty .01 .11 .18* .04 .04 -.06 -.09 -.13 .09 .12
MAQ- Total .40* .44* .54* .11 .36* .41* .23* .16* .55* .51*
MAQ- Comp .34* .37* .33* .10 .25* .20* .05 -.02 .26* .24*
MAQ- Bene .43* .50* .37* .12 .36* .37* .18* .10 .35* .28*
MAQ- NonMal .34* .31* .47* .14 .30* .37* .23* .21* .44* .38*
MAQ- Grat .27* .34* .34* .03 .25* .24* .10 .09 .37* .29*
MAQ- Truth .10 .13 .33* .06 .10 .14 .08 .04 .37* .33*
MAQ- Fair .21* .24* .43* .09 .23* .28* .16* .13 .43* .36*
MAQ- Promise .19* .23* .32* -.04 .24* .36* .29* .24* .45* .37*
Note. Pairwise deletion used, N=528-536. *p<.001 (for 526 df, all Pearson R values greater than |.14| meet this threshold for significance)
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Table 22. Zero-order correlations between ethical virtue scales and outcomes in India Sample
Welfare Comp Guilt Shame Altruist MIL SWL Health Ident Ident
Contrib Norms Prone Prone Bravery Ethical Ethical
(- Desir)
Big Six-H .06 .11 .42* -.09 .18 .24* -.06 -.06 .35* .21*
Big Six-A .26* .13 .29* -.18 .24* .56* .25* .12 .44* .20*
Big Six-C .34* .20* .26* -.06 .24* .53* .38* .16 .49* .22*
HEX- H (domain) .10 .14 .39* -.09 .18 .29* -.07 -.07 .36* .29*
HEX- Sincerity .10 .06 .29* -.01 .14 .19* .02 .02 .25* .14
HEX- Fairness .15 .16 .38* -.07 .21* .36* .03 -.07 .43* .33*
HEX- Greed .17 .04 .03 -.21* .07 .16 .24* .01 .08 .06
HEX- Modesty -.14 -.02 .08 -.20* -.09 -.07 -.18 -.23* -.09 .07
MAQ- Total .17 .15 .54* -.13 .28* .47* .10 .01 .47* .28*
MAQ- Comp .03 .05 .37* -.11 .07 .28* .01 -.08 .25* .14
MAQ- Bene .10 .16* .39* -.14 .21* .31* .03 -.02 .29* .15
MAQ- NonMal .25* .13 .38* -.06 .24* .42* .22* .12 .29* .13
MAQ- Grat .08 .13 .43* -.09 .21* .37* .02 .05 .41* .24*
MAQ- Truth -.04 -.04 .31* -.04 .04 -.03 -.11 -.19* -.03 .01
MAQ- Fair .15 .13 .37* -.11 .29* .39* .07 .04 .43* .24*
MAQ- Promise .21* .16 .36* -.09 .27* .48* .21* .08 .57* .35*
Note. Pairwise deletion used, N=310-312. *p<.001 (for 308 df, all Pearson R values greater than |.19| meet this threshold for significance)
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Table 23. Zero-order correlations between ethical virtue scales and outcomes in Hong Kong/Singapore Sample
Welfare Comp Guilt Shame Altruist MIL SWL Health Ident Ident
Contrib Norms Prone Prone Bravery Ethical Ethical
(- Desir)
Big Six-H .11 .06 .32* .15 .06 .11 .13 .13 .28* .23
Big Six-A .36* .27* .36* .06 .21 .35* .25* .01 .27* .14
Big Six-C .19 .08 .16 -.02 .10 .35* .27* .18 .25* .11
HEX- H (domain) .23 .13 .46* .14 .17 .21 .12 .01 .18 .15
HEX- Sincerity .09 .07 .32* .07 .20 .13 .07 .05 .17 .14
HEX- Fairness .29* .23 .50* .19 .19 .30* .23* .08 .23 .13
HEX- Greed .13 .19 .24* -.01 .23* .18 .25* .15 .04 .01
HEX- Modesty -.01 .12 .29* -.08 .11 .09 -.02 -.05 -.04 .03
MAQ- Total .31* .26* .52* .12 .31* .42* .22 .13 .45* .36*
MAQ- Comp .26* .22 .27* .13 .21 .22 .09 .09 .08 .04
MAQ- Bene .36* .35* .40* .00 .39* .32* .12 .04 .26* .14
MAQ- NonMal .21 .15 .35* .13 .17 .30* .08 -.05 .32* .21
MAQ- Grat .22 .19 .33* .03 .24* .33* .14 .16 .36* .27*
MAQ- Truth -.07 -.03 .31* .14 .05 .10 .04 .14 .20 .16
MAQ- Fair .19 .15 .40* .07 .18 .28* .23 .18 .39* .34*
MAQ- Promise .22 .15 .33* .09 .15 .40* .31* .21 .48* .41*
Note. Pairwise deletion used, N=310-312. *p<.001 (for 308 df, all Pearson R values greater than |.19| meet this threshold for significance)
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Table 24. Zero-order correlations between ethical virtue scales and outcomes in Kenya Sample
Welfare Comp Guilt Shame Altruist MIL SWL Health Ident Ident
Contrib Norms Prone Prone Bravery Ethical Ethical
(- Desir)
Big Six-H .23 -.01 .47* .09 .27* .45* .17 .07 .44* .30*
Big Six-A .30* .01 .41* .14 .29* .42* .18 .16 .41* .27*
Big Six-C .30* -.01 .31* .09 .27* .36* .22 .14 .49* .33*
HEX- H (domain) .17 .07 .33* .03 .22 .20 .01 .01 .31* .26*
HEX- Sincerity .14 .01 .31* .12 .08 .08 -.02 .05 .14 .13
HEX- Fairness .16 -.01 .38* .05 .28* .30* .13 -.11 .47* .38*
HEX- Greed .18 .05 .17 -.04 .05 .13 .15 .05 .09 .06
HEX- Modesty .13 .26* .21 -.17 .12 .12 -.09 -.24* -.01 .07
MAQ- Total .36* .14 .63* .17 .40* .52* .13 -.01 .48* .34*
MAQ- Comp .19 .15 .33* .03 .18 .19 -.03 -.03 .16 .10
MAQ- Bene .20 .20 .38* -.01 .16 .19 -.10 -.13 .21 .11
MAQ- NonMal .33* .08 .54* .12 .42* .46* .18 .07 .46* .34*
MAQ- Grat .27* .12 .52* .18 .42* .49* .17 -.03 .42* .23*
MAQ- Truth .13 -.05 .31* .12 .15 .27* -.07 .03 .15 .05
MAQ- Fair .36* .07 .57* .23 .34* .46* .22 .03 .47* .34*
MAQ- Promise .26* .05 .44* .16 .27* .49* .30* .05 .47* .31*
Note. Pairwise deletion used, N=196-205. *p<.001 (for 194 df, all Pearson R values greater than |.23| meet this threshold for significance)
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Forecasting. Forecasting power of the MAQ was examined by looking
at the relationship between MAQ scores in Wave 1 of the National Sample and an
objective measure of ethical virtue evaluated in Wave 2 of the National Sample
which was not used to select items for each domain– Time to return a paid-
in-advance survey. I predicted that those who were higher in ethical virtue as
measured by the MAQ would be more likely to return the paid-in-advance survey
as the sense of dutifulness should compel them to return the survey even though
the received no extra reward for doing so. In addition, among people who returned
the survey, I expected that ethical virtue should lead people to return the survey
in a more timely fashion, controlling for other factors that may potentially affect
time to return the survey (interest in the survey and how busy they were).
The MAQ subscales (self-report) did not significantly improve the
model predicting whether or not the survey was returned relative to the null
model, χ2(7)=9.17, p=.24. The aggregated MAQ score (self-report) also did not
significantly predict whether the survey was returned and the odds of returning
the survey were .998 times that for each unit increase in the aggregate MAQ
score. Among people who returned the survey, the strongest predictors of time to
return the survey (log-transformed) were interest in the survey and how busy they
were (both positively related, meaning that being more busy and more interested
tended to relate to taking longer to return the survey), multiple R2=.03 (adjusted
R2=.01), F (2, 124)=1.78, p=.17. The model including those control variables and
MAQ virtues had a R2=.04 (adjusted R2= -.04) and the MAQ virtues did not
explain a significant portion of variance above and beyond the control variables,
F (7, 117)=.16, p=.99.
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One might expect informant-report to be more valid and better predict
single behaviors. Using the participants who had informant-ratings on the MAQ
(aggregating informant ratings for those who had multiple informants), a logistic
regression was run predicting the same outcome. The informant-report MAQ
ratings more strongly predicted whether the main participant returned the survey
than self-report ratings. Relative to the null model, the informant-rated MAQ
scales marginally improved model fit χ2(7)=10.154, p=.18, and while the null
model correctly classified 73% of cases, this regression with the informant-rated
MAQ scales correctly classified 74%. In the multiple-logistic regression, the
significant predictors were Beneficence and Compassion; people who were more
highly rated in Beneficence tended to be more likely to return the survey (odds
ratio=1.3), while people who were higher in Compassion tended to be less likely
to return the survey (odds ratio=.81), taking into account the effect of the other
variables. Promise-Keeping and Truth-Telling, the two scales one might expect to
be most strongly related to this single act of dutifulness, showed no relationship
to the likelihood to return the survey, and the overall aggregate informant-
rated MAQ measure also did not improve prediction relative to the null model,
χ2(1)=.09, p=.77.
Among people who returned the survey, the informant-rated MAQ scales
as a whole did not significantly predict how long it took to return the survey,
F (7, 74)=.968, p=.46, R2=.08, adjusted R2=-.003. The informant-rated MAQ
scales with the largest coefficients were Non-Maleficence (b=-.19) and Compassion
(b=.25) suggesting that those higher in Compassion took longer to return the
survey and those higher in Non-Maleficence took less time to return the survey.
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When how busy people were and interest were controlled for, these coefficients
stayed about the same.
Since this is just a single behavior rather than a reliable aggregate of
behavior after many receipts of paid-in-advance surveys, it is not surprising that
the effects found were small. These findings do suggest that the informant-rated
MAQ scale (at least the Beneficence, Compassion, and Non-Maleficence subscales)
are slightly better predictors of this single behavior than the self-report subscales.
In summary, the main question this dissertation addressed was how
different models for ethical virtue compare to one another on a variety of
psychometric and validity criteria. Special interest was in the performance of
the MAQ, as this inventory is distinct from the others in its derivation from a
rationale-based approach to identifying the most fundamental ethical virtues
worthy of measurement. Main findings were that the MAQ aids in prediction of
outcomes beyond other inventories across countries, with the caveat that this may
in part reflect inflation due to socially desirable responding in the international
samples. The results also suggest the MAQ scales need improvement before they
can be used for cross-cultural measurement, and could also be improved to increase
precision for those measuring at the higher levels of ethical virtue. These findings
will be elaborated on in the discussion.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
This dissertation contributed in five main ways to the assessment of ethical
virtue. First, and perhaps most importantly, this dissertation investigated whether
the increased breadth of content represented by the Moral Actions Questionnaire
contributed to better prediction of validity criteria and other important outcomes
such as life satisfaction, meaning in life, and health, beyond what already-existing
personality inventories predict. The Moral Actions Questionnaire did predict
some validity outcomes above and beyond what the already-existing inventories
predict, but some caution should be exercised in interpreting these results in the
international samples due to the evidence found for socially desirable responding
(that is, correlations between ethical virtue scales and “is an ethical/moral person”
being more attenuated for the MAQ than for the H-HEXACO scale when other
desirable attributes were accounted for). In terms of the relationship between
ethical virtue and meaning and satisfaction with life, the MAQ scales did aid
in prediction above other scales in most samples (i.e., in the U.S. and Hong
Kong/Singapore samples, and especially in Kenya, but not in India). Across
countries, ethical virtue was consistently positively related to meaning in life, but
the relationship with satisfaction with life was weaker and more inconsistent. The
single-item self-report indicator of health status tended to be weakly but positively
related to ethical virtue across countries.
One explanation for the finding that ethical virtue relates to meaning in
life (but not satisfaction with life) is that people who are more virtuous tend to
organize their lives around ethical principles. This would be expected to create
higher levels of meaning, but not necessarily higher levels of life satisfaction,
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since constraining oneself to ethical behavior is sometimes less enjoyable than the
alternative. Another explanation for the relationship found between meaning in life
and ethical virtue has to do with social relatedness. Multiple studies have found
that meaning in life is related to whether social needs such as sense of belonging
and need for relatedness have been met (King, Heintzelman, & Ward, 2016). It
is possible that ethical virtue is related to having more fulfilling relationships,
through its impact on the establishment of mutual trust and reciprocity. If that
were the case, people higher on ethical virtue may have more meaningful lives
due to their needs for social relatedness being met to a higher degree. However,
this explanation does not necessarily account for why ethical virtue would have a
stronger relationship with meaning in life than satisfaction with life.
The forecasting analysis suggested that informant responses may be more
valid than self-report responses, an interpretation consistent with past research
suggesting that for highly evaluative traits, others are more accurate than the
self, i.e., Vazire (2010); Vazire and Mehl (2008). More specifically, the informant
MAQ scales (but not the self-reported MAQ scales) very slightly contributed to
a forecasting prediction of whether a paid-in-advance survey would be returned
or not. However, the MAQ scales most predictive of whether or not the survey
was returned were not those relating primarily to some moral sensibility related
to dutifulness, as was expected. It is possible that the mechanism hypothesized
to relate to returning the survey– the sense of dutifulness– was incorrect, and
it is actually a sense of reciprocity or beneficence toward the research team
that led people to return the survey. And though not originally predicted, it is
possible that having a high level of compassion (as perceived by knowledgeable
informants) may lead people to spend a lot of time attending to the needs of
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others, distractions that could lead them to neglect obligations that seem less
pressing.
A second way in which this dissertation contributed to the assessment
of ethical virtue has to do with its investigation of the psychometric quality of
measures for seven conceptually distinct ethical virtues across self- and informant-
report data, across five different countries, across time, and across varying levels
of the latent trait. Further, on many of these criteria the MAQ was compared to
already-existing personality traits that can be considered competing models of
ethical virtue that are already integrated into personality models.
A main question was how the seven subscales would compare to personality
scales that were purely empirically driven, their development constrained by their
relation to other personality factors. The MAQ scales had similar cross-time
stability (over a one-year span) as the HEXACO-H scale. With respect to internal
consistency, the MAQ scales Fairness and Promise-Keeping fared the best across
countries, better than the HEXACO-H and Big Six-H, while Truth-Telling and
Compassion fared the worst, with lower than acceptable levels of alpha values.
Fairness and Promise-Keeping were also the strongest MAQ scales across countries
in informant-report data, in terms of internal consistency.
The MAQ scales were generally less unidimensional than the Big Six-H and
HEXACO-H scales, with the exception of Beneficence and Non-Maleficence, which
were comparable in their unidimensionality. For informant data, the Beneficence
and Non-Maleficence scales also had the highest unidimensionality across countries;
all other MAQ scales showed wide variation in their unidimensionality across
countries (which was one contributor to the poor fit found in the CFAs and lack
of measurement invariance found across countries).
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The latent trait estimated using the Big Six-H and the latent trait
estimated using the full MAQ inventory showed similar patterns regarding error
of estimation across the latent trait– there was more measurement error for higher
levels of the latent trait for both MAQ and Big Six-H, and this pattern also held
for informant-rated MAQ. This could in part be due to the fact that the MAQ was
predominantly designed to measure a set of minimum moral obligations that are
agreed upon as morally significant across cultures, rather than supererogatory ones
that reflect extreme or outstanding levels of virtue. Another explanation is the fact
that the IPIP – the item pool from which the MAQ items were generated– lacks
more neutral descriptors of ethical virtue. For example, a high-difficulty indicator
of truth-telling might be telling the truth even when doing so would create stress
or difficulties. The IPIP, in its emphasis on short, straight-forward items, lacks
nuanced items like this, which may be helpful for creating indicators of higher
levels of virtue.
A third way that this dissertation contributed to the assessment of ethical
virtue was in its examination of the structure of ethical virtue across countries and
different types of data. Across self- and informant-report data, models with more
factors tended to have better fit in the training sets, but the downside of models
with more factors, particularly factors that are highly correlated, is that estimation
problems are more likely to occur in cross-cultural data, which is exactly what
happened here. A model with two broad factors worked best cross-culturally in
both self- and informant-report data (but did not have acceptable levels of fit
cross-culturally; none of the models did). One of these factors was characterized by
ethical virtues centered on avoiding violation of minatory ethical duties (Promise-
Keeping, Truth-Telling, and Fairness), and another was focused on fulfilling
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hortatory duties, which are more likely to be motivated primarily by social
emotions such as sympathy (Compassion and Beneficence). The pattern of factor
correlations roughly suggested that Non-Maleficence and Gratitude/Reciprocity
were interstitial to these two domains, meaning that these ethical virtues may be a
blend of the two factors. Both Non-Maleficence and Gratitude/Reciprocity have a
clear impact on the well-being of individual others as the hortatory duties do, but
they also have a strong rational basis informed by the more obligatory principles of
fairness and fulfilling minimum expectations for behavior, so an argument could be
made that these factors are interstitial from a rational as well as empirical basis.
In the informant data, the model that fit the best across countries was a
two-factor model which dropped the items for Gratitude/Reciprocity entirely,
and had two factors corresponding to what could be labeled justice (Promise-
Keeping, Truth-Telling, and Fairness) and care (Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, and
Compassion). This is consistent with what Gibbs (2013) suggests is at the core of
the moral domain and moral development: moral sensibilities about the “right”
and the “good.” Gibbs (2013) characterization of the “right” involves knowledge
about moral responsibilities, fair-mindedness and respect for the autonomy of
others, and his characterization of the “good” involves all forms of action intended
to benefit or minimize the risk of harm to others. In the present data, it is difficult
to determine whether a model distinguishing hortatory duties and minatory ones
is most accurate, or one distinguishing care and justice, as results are different at
the item-level than at the scale-level, and multiple MAQ scales had problems with
multi-dimensionality.
The current results suggest factorial and scalar measurement invariance
across countries cannot be assumed for either the self- or informant-report
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version of the Moral Actions Questionnaire. This means that the content of the
dimensions in each model may vary across countries, and any country-level mean
differences observed in the dimensions should not be attributed to true mean
differences in ethical virtues. Though the lack of measurement invariance implies
that the current data cannot justify cross-cultural inferences, it is not necessarily a
problem for the structural validity of the Moral Actions Questionnaire. It may be
the case that the meaning of each of these ethical virtues truly is different cross-
culturally, and an emic approach is most appropriate, where a different model of
ethical virtue is derived given considerations specific to that country.
In general, the informant scales were much more highly correlated than the
self-report scales, suggesting that people differentiate among these ethical virtues
more for themselves than they do for others. Thus, although informant scales seem
to be more more advantageous for the purpose of forecasting, the self-report scales
seem to be more differentiating. So both self- and informant-reports have their
own utility for measuring the domain of ethical virtue.
The dimensions that were most independent across both self-report and
informant data were Promise-Keeping and Compassion, which raises the question
of whether there are underlying psychological processes arising in (relatively)
independent variation in these two ethical virtues in particular. It seems plausible
that social emotions such as empathy may be required for compassion, while self-
regulatory abilities or a sense of duty may motivate the more minatory ethical
virtues (centered on Promise-Keeping). However, another key distinction between
these virtues lies in the consequence that ensues when one acts in accordance with
or violates them: Violating minatory ethical virtues such as keeping one’s promises
is more likely to result in sanctions than failing to act compassionately in a given
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instance. As the relevance of ethical virtues is largely in their impact on others, it
is plausible that what separates these domains are differences in the response from
one’s environment when the virtue is acted out: punishment or criticism, in the
case of violations of promise-keeping, and praise in the case of compassion.
Fourth, the results suggested some clear areas of needed improvement for
the Moral Actions Questionnaire. The Truth-Telling items, though internally
consistent in the U.S. samples, showed different patterns in their relationship to
each other across countries (see Appendix A). This may be due to the fact that
one of the items chosen for this scale used an idiom that may not work well in a
cross-cultural context (“stretches the truth”) and others implied varied reasons
for deception or telling the truth– items included “is not good at deceiving other
people,” and “tells other people what they want to hear.” The Compassion scale
and Gratitude/Reciprocity scale each formed two dimensions, so future versions of
these scales should diversify the content so that these scales more evenly represent
relevant behaviors to this domain. Alternatively, each scale could be split up into
two separate scales, each with their own content. In addition, all scales should be
longer in order to raise their alpha to standard levels of acceptability.
The IRT analysis suggested that more items that are difficult to endorse
should be added, so that the latent trait is more precisely estimated for those
higher in ethical virtue. And finally, future versions of this scale should not rely
solely on IPIP items, as one limitation, particularly for the Truth-Telling scale,
was the number of well-performing items available from the IPIP for inclusion
in each scale. In general, the IPIP is currently heavily used for the development
of personality scales, and one main lesson from this dissertation research is
that heavy reliance on this item pool may lead to difficulties with respect to
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generalizability to international samples with less familiarity with idioms specific
to the American-English context, as well as difficulties with respect to IRT criteria.
Fifth, the current results had some implication for theories about how
ethical virtues develop, which can be tested more stringently in the future using
longitudinal data and improved scales. The validity indicator with the strongest
and most consistent relation to the ethical virtue scales across countries was
guilt proneness (but not shame proneness). Both empirical literature on moral
development and philosophical theories regarding how ethical virtues develop
converge on the role of guilt in moral behavior. Cohen et al. (2011) found
that the tendency to experience guilt (defined both as a tendency to engage in
reparative behavior after doing something wrong, and as a tendency to experience
a negative emotional response to acting immorally in situations without a public
embarrassment component) was positively related to Honesty/Humility from
the HEXACO model, and negatively related to manipulative work behaviors as
measured by the Self Reported Negotiation Strategies II Scale (SINS-II) (Cohen
et al., 2011). In addition, both Aristotle and Plato suggest that shame is “a
semi-virtue of the learner” (Burnyeat, 1980)– in order to be amenable to moral
education, children must feel a sense of internal pain rather than pain due solely to
external consequences. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle’s definition of shame is more
consistent with the operationalization of guilt proneness rather than shame
proneness on the GASP scale, as he defines it as “pain or disturbance in regard
to bad things, whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in
discredit...we feel shame at such bad things as we think are disgraceful to ourselves
or to those we care for. These evils are, in the first place, due to moral badness.”
Aristotle (350 BCE) then goes on to list a number of acts that one should feel
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shame about, including acting cowardly, wronging people about money, and
making profit in disgraceful ways. From these examples it is clear that Aristotle
does not restrict his definition of shame to acts that are publicly observed. Instead,
his conception of shame encompasses feeling internally pained due to any wrongful
act.
A final note about compassion: according to many ethical theorists,
compassion is the most fundamental of the ethical virtues, but it is also considered
a nascent affective tendency by Mencius that needs to be cultivated in order to
grow into the full virtue of benevolence (Flanagan, 2014). In its nascent form,
compassion is felt in response to particular instances of suffering, but not when
encountering all instances of suffering where a compassionate response would
be appropriate. Mencius describes an example of how full benevolence may be
cultivated from the nascent sprout of compassion in a king who is indifferent to
the suffering of his people, but compassionate to the suffering of an ox about to
be slaughtered. In passage IA7–from the translation by Eno (2016)– Mencius asks
this king: “why would one accept that Your Majesty’s kindness could extend even
to the birds and beasts, but its works could not extend to the people?” In this
passage Mencius demonstrates how the felt sense of compassion in response to
the ox may be cultivated so that the king feels compassion toward his people, and
ultimately, feels a sense of compassion toward all suffering, directly observed or
imagined. This example demonstrates that the felt sense of compassion may not
be a full virtue in and of itself. This could be part of the reason the Compassion
scale tended to show weaker relations to validity outcomes than the other scales;
its possible that the Compassion scale was not capturing a full virtue, but rather
a prerequisite to developing virtue. Future research that examines compassion
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longitudinally in conjunction with other values and beliefs can lend more insight as
to whether compassion plays a role in the development of other ethical virtues.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this dissertation was to evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of the Moral Actions Questionnaire, relative to models of ethical virtue
represented in already-existing personality inventories. An inventory that uses a
rationale-based approach to more comprehensively represent the moral domain
has the potential to remedy the fact that historically, moral content was partially
excluded from personality inventories. Though the present findings highlight
multiple areas of improvement for the Moral Actions Questionnaire, particularly
in a cross-cultural context, they also suggest that a more comprehensive measure
of ethical virtue does indeed predict important outcomes above and beyond what
ethical virtue measures represented in already-existing personality inventories
predict. In addition, the differentiation between conceptually distinct ethical
virtues offered by the Moral Actions Questionnaire can inform investigations into
what broad dimensions characterize moral functioning, and help guide theoretical
perspectives on what leads to individual differences in these dimensions.
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APPENDIX A
A CLOSER LOOK AT TRUTH-TELLING AND COMPASSION
Table A.25. Correlations between Truth-Telling items in self-report data
Country 52 & 85 52 & 100 52 & 104 85 & 100 85 & 104 100 & 104
Kenya .05 -.05 -.20 .13 .04 .03
India .04 -.18 -.02 .06 .07 .13
HKS .19 -.07 -.32 -.03 -.01 .21
USA .29 -.08 -.28 -.19 -.26 .25
Table A.26. Correlations between Compassion items in self-report data
Country 88 & 71 88 & 67 88 & 42 71 &67 71 & 42 67 & 42
Kenya .37 .02 -.05 -.04 -.11 .22
India .34 -.03 .01 -.08 .05 .26
HKS .27 -.09 -.16 -.08 .00 .10
USA .39 -.16 -.26 -.26 -.25 .29
TRUTH-TELLING ITEMS: BFI100- tells other people what they want to
hear; BFI104- tries to fool others; BFI52- is not good at deceiving other people;
BFI85- seldom stretches the truth.
COMPASSION ITEMS: BFI42- looks down on any weakness; BFI67- likes
the idea that only the strong should survive; BFI71- hates to see anyone suffer,
even my worst enemy; BFI88- reacts compassionately to difficult people.
71
APPENDIX B
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS
Table B.27. Results from item-level Exploratory Factor Analysis with promax
rotation using maximum likelihood estimation in Student/Informant sample
(N=842) (which informed structures tested in international samples)- two-factor
solution
Subscale Item F1 F2
BENEFICENCE Inf37 .02 .67 goes out of his/her way to cheer up people who
appear down.
BENEFICENCE Inf44 -.12 .64 is sensitive to the needs of others.
BENEFICENCE Inf21 .24 -.24 doesn’t waste time with others’ troubles.
BENEFICENCE Inf28 .26 -.36 feels little concern for others.
COMPASSION Inf25 .21 .72 reacts compassionately to difficult people.
COMPASSION Inf41 .23 .78 hates to see anyone suffer, even his/her worst enemy.
COMPASSION Inf16 .15 -.33 likes the idea that only the strong should survive.
COMPASSION Inf32 .30 -.38 looks down on any weakness.
NONMAL Inf26 -.14 .50 makes a point of trying not to hurt others in pursuit
of his/her goals.
NONMAL Inf31 .12 .66 prevents himself/herself from saying mean things.
NONMAL Inf15 .13 -.50 is sometimes rude to others.
NONMAL Inf42 .47 -.22 does things out of revenge.
FAIRNESS Inf17 -.15 .58 has always been completely fair to others.
FAIRNESS Inf40 -.40 .13 would never take things that aren’t his/hers.
FAIRNESS Inf24 .83 .11 cheats to get ahead.
FAIRNESS Inf33 .69 -.13 takes advantage of others.
TRUTH Inf10 -.04 .25 is not good at deceiving other people.
TRUTH Inf29 -.14 .17 seldom stretches the truth.
TRUTH Inf36 .54 -.12 tries to fool others.
TRUTH Inf45 .57 .40 tells other people what they want to hear.
PROMISE Inf22 -.44 .26 honors all the vows he/she has made.
PROMISE Inf38 -.53 .13 follows through on his/her commitments.
PROMISE Inf27 .74 .01 breaks his/her promises.
PROMISE Inf43 .62 .07 shirks his/her duties.
GRAT/RECIP Inf23 -.32 .41 expresses thanks to those who care about him/her.
GRAT/RECIP Inf34 -.23 .45 is never too busy to help a friend.
GRAT/RECIP Inf18 .54 -.23 neglects to thank others for their help.
GRAT/RECIP Inf39 .53 -.18 doesn’t see the need to acknowledge those who are
good to him/her.
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Table B.28. Results from item-level Exploratory Factor Analysis with promax
rotation using maximum likelihood estimation in Student/Informant sample
(N=842) (which informed structures tested in international samples)- three-factor
solution
Subscale Item F1 F2 F3
BENEFICENCE Inf37 .64 -.06 .01
BENEFICENCE Inf44 .59 -.15 -.08
BENEFICENCE Inf21 .01 -.03 .55
BENEFICENCE Inf28 -.15 .05 .48
COMPASSION Inf25 .60 .16 -.10
COMPASSION Inf41 .65 .16 -.08
COMPASSION Inf16 .00 -.17 .69
COMPASSION Inf32 -.11 .02 .62
NONMAL Inf26 .43 -.12 -.14
NONMAL Inf31 .50 .13 -.21
NONMAL Inf15 -.29 -.02 .42
NONMAL Inf42 -.08 .27 .41
FAIRNESS Inf17 .56 -.20 -.03
FAIRNESS Inf40 .15 -.35 -.08
FAIRNESS Inf24 .18 .56 .41
FAIRNESS Inf33 -.02 .45 .43
TRUTH Inf10 .19 -.02 -.10
TRUTH Inf29 .21 -.18 .05
TRUTH Inf36 -.01 .33 .39
TRUTH Inf45 .32 .46 .06
PROMISE Inf22 .42 -.57 .22
PROMISE Inf38 .33 -.67 .28
PROMISE Inf27 -.09 .72 .00
PROMISE Inf43 .07 .47 .20
GRAT/RECIP Inf23 .45 -.33 -.01
GRAT/RECIP Inf34 .44 -.24 -.06
GRAT/RECIP Inf18 -.16 .38 .31
GRAT/RECIP Inf39 -.09 .34 .36
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Table B.29. Results from Exploratory Factor Analysis with promax rotation using
maximum likelihood estimation in Community sample (n=538)- two-factor solution
F1 F2
BENEFICENCE T91 -.36 .14 goes out of his/her way to cheer up people who
appear down.
BENEFICENCE T112 -.58 .00 is sensitive to the needs of others.
BENEFICENCE T26 .59 .13 doesn’t waste time with others’ troubles.
BENEFICENCE T76 .75 .30 feels little concern for others.
COMPASSION T103 -.47 -.09 reacts compassionately to difficult people.
COMPASSION T79 -.35 -.04 hates to see anyone suffer, even his/her worst enemy.
COMPASSION T74 .72 .37 likes the idea that only the strong should survive.
COMPASSION T45 .49 .09 looks down on any weakness.
NONMAL T116 -.31 .18 makes a point of trying not to hurt others in pursuit
of his/her goals.
NONMAL T123 -.23 .21 prevents himself/herself from saying mean things.
NONMAL T108 .28 -.14 is sometimes rude to others.
NONMAL T62 .30 -.16 does things out of revenge.
FAIRNESS T95 .18 .61 has always been completely fair to others.
FAIRNESS T40 -.11 .33 would never take things that aren’t his/hers.
FAIRNESS T102 .13 -.38 cheats to get ahead.
FAIRNESS T83 .32 -.28 takes advantage of others.
TRUTH T55 -.12 .16 is not good at deceiving other people.
TRUTH T100 -.03 .32 seldom stretches the truth.
TRUTH T120 .09 -.14 tries to fool others.
TRUTH T124 .17 -.34 tells other people what they want to hear.
PROMISE T119 .13 .65 honors all the vows he/she has made.
PROMISE T86 .33 .72 follows through on his/her commitments.
PROMISE T97 -.25 -.84 breaks his/her promises.
PROMISE T104 -.02 -.51 shirks his/her duties.
GRAT/RECIP T96 -.28 .26 expresses thanks to those who care about him/her.
GRAT/RECIP T106 -.14 .33 is never too busy to help a friend.
GRAT/RECIP T78 .49 -.11 neglects to thank others for their help.
GRAT/RECIP T92 .22 -.34 doesn’t see the need to acknowledge those who are
good to him/her.
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Table B.30. Results from Exploratory Factor Analysis with promax rotation
using maximum likelihood estimation in Community sample (n=538)- three-factor
solution
Subscale Item F1 F2 F3
BENEFICENCE T91 .63 .23 .29
BENEFICENCE T112 .63 .03 .03
BENEFICENCE T26 -.50 .11 .09
BENEFICENCE T76 -.58 .26 .13
COMPASSION T103 .53 -.03 .11
COMPASSION T79 .41 .01 .09
COMPASSION T74 -.39 .43 .36
COMPASSION T45 -.32 .13 .22
NONMAL T116 .40 .18 .03
NONMAL T123 .27 .17 -.07
NONMAL T108 -.12 -.03 .33
NONMAL T62 -.24 -.09 .20
FAIRNESS T95 .01 .51 -.02
FAIRNESS T40 .11 .23 -.19
FAIRNESS T102 .04 -.19 .47
FAIRNESS T83 -.03 -.06 .63
TRUTH T55 .00 .06 -.28
TRUTH T100 -.07 .18 -.31
TRUTH T120 .18 .03 .49
TRUTH T124 .05 -.14 .53
PROMISE T119 .06 .55 -.04
PROMISE T86 -.11 .59 -.03
PROMISE T97 .12 -.63 .23
PROMISE T104 .10 -.31 .40
GRAT/RECIP T96 .31 .21 -.10
GRAT/RECIP T106 .30 .31 .06
GRAT/RECIP T78 -.36 -.03 .25
GRAT/RECIP T92 -.23 -.26 .16
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APPENDIX C
RELIABILITY OF RATERS FOR SIX MAQ DOMAINS
Table C.31. Standardized alpha values for 3 raters’ ratings of 2458 IPIP items’
relevance to each of the original six MAQ domains
Moral Domain Standardized Alpha
Promise-keeping .664
Truth-telling .699
Reciprocity .649
Non-maleficence .714
Beneficence .733
Fairness .634
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